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Circuit Court, S. D. Yew York.
OLD DOMINION STEAMSHIP CO. v. McKENNA

ET AL.

The procurement of workmen, who are employed upon terms as to wages which
are just and satisfactory to quit work inl abody for the purpose of hiflicting injury
and damage upon the employer by persons who are not in his employ, and until the
employer should accede to demands of such outside persons; which he is under no
obligation to grant, constitutes in law a malicious and illegal interference with the
employer's business, which is actionable.
Declaring and attempting to enforce a boycott for the purpose of compelling an
employer to pay such a rate of wages to his employees us the boycotters wio are not
in his employ might 'demand, are acts rendering the boycotters liable in damages,
and are also misdemeanors at common law as well as by Pen. Code N. Y.
168.
All combinations and associations designed to coerce workmen to become membets of such combinations or associations, or to interfere with, obstruct, vex or annoy them in workitig, or in obtaining work, because they are not members, or in
order to induce them to become members ; or designed to prevent employers from
making a just discrimination in the rate of wages paid to the skilful and to the unskilful ; to the diligent and to the lazy; to the efficient and to the inefficient ; and
all associations designed to interfere with the perfect freedom of employers in the
proper management and control of their lawful business, or to dictate in any pariclar the terms upon which their business shall be conducted, by means of threats of
injury or loss, by interfierence with their property or traffic, or with their lawfil employment of other persons, or designed to abridge any of these rights-are pro tanto
illegal combinations or associations ; and all acts done in furtherance of such intentions by such means, and accompanied by damage, are actionable.
An action to recover damages from those who have combined to do such an injury
to a plaintilf's business, and the use of his property, is 11an action for an injury to
property," within the meaning of section 549, subd. 2, Code Civil Proc. N. Y., and
an order for the arrest of defendanms may be granted therein.

MOTION to Discharge from Arrest.

Clarence A. Seward, for plaintiffs.
Louis P. Post and Samuel Ashton, for defendants.
BROWN, J.-This action was brought to recover $20,000 damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff through the
unlawful action of the defendants, in the recent strike of the 'long-

shore-men, and in their attempt to boycott the plaintiff in its business as a common carrier. The defendants are alleged to constitute
or to style themselves, an " Executive Board of the Ocean Associa-

tion of the 'Longshore-men's Union."

At the time of the com-

mencement of the action they were arrested and held to bail under
orders of arrest issued in conformity with the state practice. The

defendunts now move, upon the plaintiff's papers only, to vacate
the order of arrest, on the ground that the material facts charged
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are alleged on information and belief only, without a sufficient
statement of 'the sources of information ; that the facts stated do
not make out a prima facie case ; that it appears that the defendants were acting within their legal rights; and that the plaintiffs
loss, if any, is damnum absque iniuria; and that, at best, tile
plaintiffs case is so doubtful, that the order of arrest should not be
sustained.
I have carefully considered the elaborate arguments of counsel,
and examined the numerous authorities referred to. For lack of
time, I can only state my conclusions :
1. All the material avermbnts are either stated positively, or the
source of information is sufficiently indicated.
2. The facts stated in the complaint and affidavit constitute a
legal cause of action against all the defendants, for the actual damages suffered, for the following reasons :
(a) The plaintiff was engaged in the legal calling of a common
carrier, owning vessels, lighters 'and other craft used in its business,
in the employment of which numerous workmen were necessary,
who, as the complaint avers, were employed "upon terms as to
wages which were just and satisfactory."
(b) The defendants, not being in plaintiff's employ, and without
any legal justification, so far as appears-a mere dispute about
wages, the Mierits of which are not stated, not being any legal justification-procured plaintiff's workmen in this city and in southern
ports to quit work in a body, for the purpose of inflicting injury
and damage upon the plaintiff until it should accede to the defendant's demands, and pay southern negroes the same wages as New
York longshore-men, which the plaintiff was under no obligation to
grant; and such procurement of workmen to quit work being designed to inflict injury on the plaintiff, and not being justified, cnstituted in law a malicious and illegal interference with the plaintiff's
business, which is actionable.
(c) After the plaintiff's workmen, through the defendants' procurement, had quit work, the defendants, for the further unlawful
purpose of compelling the plaintiff to pay such a rate of wages as
they might demand, declared a boycott of the plaintiff's business,
and attempted to prevent the plaintiff from carrying on any business as common carriers, or from using or employing its vessels,
lighters, etc., in that business, and endeavored to stop all dealings
of other persons with the plaintiff, by sending threatening notices

422

OLD DOINION STEAMSHI

CO. v. McKENA.

or messages to its various customers and patrons, and to the agents
of various steamship lines, and to wharfingers and warehousemen
usually dealing with the plaintiff, designed to intimidate them from
having any dealings with it, through threats of loss and expense in
case they dealt with the plaintiff by receiving, storing or transmitting its goods, or otherwise ; and various persons were deterred
from dealing with the plaintiff in consequence of such intimidations, and refused to perform existing contracts, and withheld
their former customary business, greatly to the plaintiff's damage.
(d) The acts last mentioned were not only illegal, rendering the
defendants liable in damages, but also misdemeanors at common
law, as well as by section 168 of the Penal Code of this state.
(e) Associations have no more right to inflict injury upon others
than individuals have. All combinations and associations designed
to coerce workmen to become members, or to interfere with, obstruct, vex or annoy them in working, or in obtaining work, because
they are not members, or in order to induce them to become members ; or designed to prevent employers from making a just discrimination in the rate of wages paid to the skilful and to the
unskillful; to the diligent and to the lazy ; to the efficient and to
the inefficient; and all associations designed to interfere with the
perfect freedom of employers in the proper management and control of their lawful business, or to dictate in any particular the
terms upon which their business shall be conducted, by means of
threats of injury or loss, by interference with their property or
traffic, or with their lawful employment of other persons, or designed
to abridge any of these rights,-are pro tanto illegal combinations
or associations ; and all acts done in furtherance of such intentions
by such means, and accompanied by damage, are actionable. See
Greenh. Pub. Pol. 648, 653; People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 1;
Tarleton v. eThawley, Peake, *205; Bafael v. T erelst, 2 W. Bl.
1055; Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216; Bowen v. Hall,' 6 Q. B.
Div. 333, 337; Gregory v. Duke of Brunswick, 6 Man. & G.
205 ; Gunter v. Astor, 4 J. B. Moore 12 ; Beg. v Rowlands, 17
Adol. & E. (N. S.) 671, 685; Mogul St. Co. v. MfcGregor, 15 Q.
B. Div. 476; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Id. 1; State v. -Donaldson,82 N. J. Law 151; Master
Stevedores' Ass'n. v. Walsh, 2 Daly 1, 13; Johnston Co. v. 3feinhardt, 60 How. Pr. 168; Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 116.
3. There is no such doubt concerning the plaintiff's legal rights
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as should debar it from the usual remedy. The motion to discharge
from arrest is therefore denied.
Among the practical legal questions
which the recent discussion of social
problems has brought forward, none
have assumed greater prominence than
the discussion as to how far labor and
trade combinations arc in violation of the
common law of conspiracy. Generally
speaking, the American people have a
peculiar genius for combinations. Many
enterprises that in other countries are
controlled by government, in our country,
are carried out by voluntary combinations. DeTocqueville has pointed out
the infinite diversity of these associations ;
and he ascribes to them an important
influence in upholding our institutions.
But combinations of this character are
not altogether beneficial; and there
seems to be a growing opinion of late
that these combinations have in some
instances, stepped beyond the bounds of
legitimate action. When we behold the
vicious methods often resorted to by
associated corporations and individuals
in controlling markets, or the tyranny of
labor combinations, every one must admit
that, at least in some of their phases,
these combinations assume the character
of unlawful con'spiracies. It is a maxim
of the law that there is no wrong without
a remedy; and there is no exception in
the case of wrongs inflicted by combinations of this character.
leccnt and
direct adjudications, however, are few,
and it will be necessary to consider many
old English decisions and statutes and
so to trace the development of this branch
of the law in this country. And although
it is possible to collect many general
principles which run through the cases,
yet there are many doubtful points still
unsettled. It is almost impossible to lay
down general rules which will always
govern, and the only way in which the
rules of law which apply to this subject
can be understood, is by referring to the
particular cases where they have been

expounded and applied. And in order
to bring out clearly the opinions of the
various jurists who have discussed this
subject, we will often find it necessary to
cite the exact words which they use.
A conspiracy is a confederacy of two
or more persons to accomplish some unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful
purpose by some unlawful means. 2
Bish. Cr. Law (7th ed.) 175 ; Com. v.
Hunt, 4 Met. 111 ; Lambert v. People,
9 Cow. 601 ; Com. v. ,Tudd, 2 Mass.
329 ; Whart. Cr. Law (9th ed.) 1337 ;
People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9. But in
applying this definition to trade and labor,
as well as other combinations, it becomes
an important question as to what is the
meaning to be given to the word " unlawful." Unlawful in this connection
does not necessarily mean indictable as
an offence. The additional power and
dangerous character of a conspiracy often
render a combination to do an act, criminal; when, ifthe act were done singly
indietability would not attach.
Trade and labor combinations manifest
themselves under different forms. There
may be combinations merely to agree on
certain terms in dealing with others.
Again, combinations may be formed to
carry out their demands by means of
violence. And still other combinations
may not contemplate violence, but may be
formed for the purpose of prdjudicing,
coercing or defrauding individuals or the
public. This is not intended as a scientific division of the subject. Other forms
of trade and labor combinations might
manifest themselves. And often combinations may have the characteristics of
more than one of these kinds. But it
will be convenient to discuss the subject
under these headings; and this will
enable us to bring out as clearly as possible, which combinations are considered
legal, and which illegal.
Combinations where a Number of Labor-
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ers or Business Men merely agree on cer-

ment among themselves, would not have
been illegal. As in the case of journeydealingwith others.-An example of such men conspiring to raise their wages ; each
a combination is where a number of
may insist on raising his wages, if he
workingmen meet and agree upon a price can; but if several meet for the same
whicha they will ask for their labor and purpose, it is illegal, and the parties may
then say to their employer that they will be indicted for conspiracy."
not work for him except at the price fixed
And in King v. Eccles, I Leach 274,
upon. It will be observed that such a Lord MAtisFLELD places combinations to
combination is one of the mildest char- raise prices on the same footing as tho:e
acter. There is no intention to use vio- to raise wages. As to combinations to
lence, nor is it sought to dictate to the raise prices of commodities at that time,
employer methods of conducting his bus- see also, Rex v. Norris, 2 Ken. 300.
iness in regard to matters with which tile le says : "Persons in possession of any
workmen are not concerned.
In articles of trade may sell them at such
England, there seems to be good reason price as they individually may please, but
to believe that even such a combination if they confederate and agree not to sell
as this was an indictable conspiracy at under certain prices it is conspiracy. So
common law. In early times this sub- every malan may work at what price he
ject was regulated by statute. And all pleases, but a combination not to work
combinations to agree on terms to be under certain prices is an indictable
asked for work were statutory conspira- offence."
cies. But, independently of the statutes,
Although some of these decisions are
there seems to have been an opinion that of little authority yet there is good reason
such combinations were indictable at to believe that in England all combinacommon law.
tions to raise the prices of wages or of
The ease of Rex v. Journeynen Tailors commodities were criminal at common
of Cambridge, 8 Mod. 10, decided in law. This seems to have been the general
1721, is usually cited in this connection. opinion in 1825 as far as labor combinaThis case grew out of an indictment for tions were concerned. And in that year
conspiracy to raise wages, and it was held parliament passed an act expressly
on motion in arrest of judgment, that the authorizing labor combinations where
indictment need not conclude contra workmen simply act in concert in
formam statuti, because it was for a con- demanding particular wages, hours of
spiracy which was an offence at common work, &c.
law. It should be remarked, however,
It would seem, however, that in some
that thiscase is of little authority, the cases the courts, previous to the statute
book it is published in, 8 Mod. Rep. of 1825, held such combinations illegal
being notoriously full
of mistakes. For because wages at that time were fixed by
instance, Justice WILMOT, said of it that statute. And the very act of seeking to
nine cases out of ten in that book are get higher than statutory wages was
totally mistaken: Kingl v. Earris, 7 unlawful.
Hence a combination to
demand higher wages was a conspiracy
Term Rep. 239.
In Rex v. Mawbey, 6 Term Rep. 619, to commit an offence, and hence, of
This may serve to
there is a dictum of GRoss, J., who says: course, illegal.
"In many cases an agreement to do a explain why a mere combination to agree
certain thing has been considered as the on terms to be asked for work is not
subject of an indictment for conspiracy, illegal in this country. In regard to
although tile same act, if done separately this point SHAw, C. J., has said:
"1Although the common law in regard to
by each individual, without any agreetain terms which theytwill all ask in
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conspiracy in this Commonwealth is in
force, yet it will not necessarily follow
that every indictment at common law for

the gist of the offence was the conspiracy,
which was an offence at common law. At
the same time it was conceded, that the
unlawful object to be accomplished was
this offence is a precedent for a similar
the raising of wages above the rate fixed
indictment in this state. The general
by a general act of parliament. It was
rule of the common law is, that it is a
therefore a conspiracy to violate a general
criminal and indictable offence, for two
statute law, made for the regulation of a
or more to confederate and combine
large branch of trade, affecting the comtogether, by concerted means, to do that
which is unlawful or criminal, to the fort and interest of the public ; and thus,
injury of the public, or portions or classes the object to be accomplished by the conof the community, or even to the rights spiracy was unlawful if not criminal."
Com. v. Hlunt, 4 Met. 121. See, also,
of an individual. This rule of law may
Com. v. Carlisle, Bright. 37. Hence, in
be equally in force as a rule of the common law, in England and in this Com- this country it seems to be well settled
law that a combination of laborers merely
monwealth ; and yet it must depend upon
the local laws of each country to deter- to agree on what terms they are to work
mine whether the purpose to be accom- is not criminal. 2 Bish. Cr. Law 233;
plished by the combination, or the conMaster Stevedores' Ass'n v. Walsh, 2 Daly
certed means of accomplishing it, be 5 ; State v. Donaldson, 3 Yroom 151 ;
unlawful or criminal in the respective Johnson v. Meinhart, 60 How. Pr. Rep.
171. But see, People v. Fisher, 14
countries. All those laws of the parent
country, whether ruiles of the common Wend. 9. Something more must be
law, or early English statutes, which alleged and proved than a mere combiwere made for the purpose of regulating
nation. Any other doctrine would be
entirely inconsistent with the spirit of our
the wages of laborers, the settlement of
paupers, and making it penal for anyone institutions. The "great employer who is
to use a trade or handicraft to which he perhaps a business firm or corporation in
in which is concentrated the capital of
had not served a full apprenticeship-not
being adapted to the circumstances of our many persons would have a great
colonial condition-were not adopted,
advantage over its employees if each of
used or approved, and therefore do not them were required to treat with it sepacome within the description of the laws
rately. It is said that in union there is
adopted and confirmed by the provision
strength. If capital has a right to comof the constitution already cited. This bine, labor also has a right to combine;
consideration will do something towards
and both labor and capital are held to the
reconciling the English and American
same rules in determining the lawfulness
cases, and may indicate how far the prin- of the combination.
ciples of the English cases will apply in
Combinations where the Purposesof the
this Commonwealth, and show why a
Organizationare sought to be accomplished
conviction in England, in niany cases by Violence.-About this form of conspirwould not be a precedent for a like con- acy there need be little said. To assault
viction here.
The King v. Journeymen a man is criminal; and to conspire to conTailors of Cambridge, 8 Mod. 10, for
duct a strike or boycott by a systematic
instance, is commonly cited as an authorresort to assault and batteryis a conspirity for an indictment at common law, and
acy to accomplish a purpose by unlawful
a conviction of journeymen mechanics of
means, thus bringing it within the defina conspiracy to raise their wages. It was
ition given above: MasterStevedores' Asthere held, that the indictment need not sociation v. Walsh, 2 Daly 10 ; Johnson
conclude contraformam statuti, because
v. 3feinhart, 60 How. Pr. Rep. 168;
VoL. XXX.-54
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Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 11 . It is
very necessary, however, that this form
of trade and labor conspiracies be carefully distinguished from the other forms.
And the language of the decisions should
be carefully scrutinized in order to ascertain whether the unlawfulness of the
combination is placed upon this ground
or upon other grounds.
Combinations where Violence is not contemplated, but which are formed for the
pupose of Prjeudicing, Coercing or Defrauding Individuals or the Public.-An
example of such a conspiracy is where a
number of workmen say to an employer,
" Discharge A. B. or we will leave youbuy in this market or that market; conform to this rule or that rule, or we will
not continue in your employ." This
brings up a very delicate question: It
may be said, "Has not a man a right to
work for whom he pleases ? Has he not
a right to refuse to work for any reason
which may suit his fancy ?" To this
Generthe law must answer: "Yes."
ally speaking, every man has a right to
work for whom he pleases and to manage
his own affairs. But where a combination of men, not content with managing
their own business, seek to manage the
affairs of others ; where, by concerted
means and with an evil intent, they seek
to deprive another of his right to manage
his business, then the law steps in and
protects the man whose rights are infringed. The weight of authority seems
to be that while, generally speaking, the
right to form business relations at will is
not to be questioned, yet that right must
not be exercised to prejudice or coerce
others. This point has been often questioned, and it will be necessary to review
the principal English and American
authorities in order to gather a general
rule upon this subject and to distinguish as far as possible the seemingly
inconsistent cases. In England the subject of wages has,
from an early date, been regulated by
statute. But the statute of 6 Geo. IV.,

c. 129, enacted in 1825, repealed all
these early statutes and enacted that
combinations of laborers merely to agree
on what terms they should work would
not be unlawful. And it has been held
in England, that while the statute allowed combination of workingmen to
agree on what terms they should work,
yet a combination formed for, the purpose of coercing an employer in regard
to managing his business was not touched
by the statute and hence was indictable.
For instance, in King v. B/cerdike, 1 M.
& Rob. 179, the question came up as to
whether it was lawful for workmen to
conspire to coerce the employer to discharge certain men, by threatening to
And PATTEsoN, .,
leave in a body.
told the jury that the statute never meant
.to empower workmen to meet and combine for the purpose of dictating to the
master whom he should employ; and
that this compulsion was clearly illegal.
Questions of a similar nature to this have
come up for adjudication a number of
times in England since the Statute of 6
In many cases it has been
Geo. IV.
held that such acts were conspiracies to
violate another provision of the statute
which prohibited interfering with another
in regard to his business or labor by
threats, molestation, intimidation, and
obstruction. Yet it has been often said
that this form of conspiracy would be
criminal at common law, independently
of this latter provision of the statute :
Walsby v. Anley, 3 E. & E. 516 ; Reg.
v. Hewitt, 5 Cox 0. C. 162; Reg. v.
Duffield, Id. 404 ; Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Id.
493; Reg. v. Rowlands, 5 Id. 436; Hilton v. EJccersley, 6 E. & B. 47 ; Shelburn
v. Oliver, 13 L. T. (N. S.), 630 ; Scin.
ner v. Kitch, L. R., 2 Q. B. 392 ; Reg.
v. Bunn, 12 Cox C. C. 316 ; In re Perham, 5 Hurl. & N. 30.
We thus see that in England the dis
tinction is made between a mere combination to unite on terms which all will
ask for their work and a conspiracy in
which there is an intent to coerce or im-
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poverish another ; and that a statutory
provision allowing the former species
of combination does not include the latter spcies.
In this country the same distinction
seems to be made. And while, as we
have shown before, a mere combination
to unite on terms which all will ask for
their work is not considered unlawful in
this country, yet a combination to coerce
or impoverish another is criminal.
In People v. Melvin, 2 Wheeler Cr:
Cas. 262, and People v. Trequier, 1 Id.
142, two early New York cases, it was
held that it was criminal for the workmen to combine; and, by leaving work
in a body, coerce the employer into discharging certain men. Since 1829 this
subject has been regulated in New York
by statute, yet it has been said in that
state that such conspiracies were indictable, independently of the statute: People v. l7sher, 14 Wend. 9 ; Master Stevedores' Association v. Walsh, 2 Daly 1.
State v. Donaldson, 3 Vroom 151, was
a well-considered New Jersey case.
There was a statute in New Jersey making penal certain combinations injurious
to trade. But, as the statute was held
not to abrogate the common law, the case
was considered on common-law principles. The facts alleged in the indictment were that several employees had
formed a conspiracy IIto control, injure,
terrify and impoverish" their employers, and that they notified their employers that unless certain workmen were
discharged, that the conspirators would
leave work in a body; and on this being
refused, they ceased work as they had
threatened. It was held that such a
combination was criminal, and BEASLEY,
J., said : "It appears to me that it is
not to be denied, that the alleged aim of
this combination was unlawful; the effort
was to dictate to this employer whom he
should discharge from his employ. 'This
was an unwarrantable interference with
the conduct of his business, and it seems
impossible that such acts should not be,

in their usual effects, highly injurious.
How far is this mode of dictation to be
held lawful ? If the manufacturer can
be compelled in this way to discharge
two or more hands, he can, by similar
means, be coerced to retain such workmen as the conspirators may choose to
designate. So his customers may be proscribed, and his business in other respects
controlled. I cannot regard such a course
of conduct as lawful. * * * In the
natural position of things, each man acting as an individual, there would be no
coercion ; if a single employee should demand the discharge of a co-employee,
the employer would retain his freedom,
for he could entertain or repel the requisition without embarrassment to his concerns ; but in the presence of a coalition
of his employees, it would be but a waste
of time to pause to prove that, in most
cases, he must submit under pain of often
the most ruinous losses, to the conditions
imposed on his necessities. It is difficult
to believe that a right exists in law which
we can scarcely conceive can produce, in
any posture of affairs, other than injurious results. It is simply the right of
workmen, by concert of action, and by
taking advantage of their position, to
control the business of another. * * *
In my opinion, this indictment sufficiently shows that the force of the confederates was brought to bear upon their
employer for the purpose of oppression
and mischief, and that this amounts to a
conspiracy." See also Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. I ; Snowv. Wheeler, 113
Id. 179; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Id. 555.
But see Payne v. Rd. Co., 13 B. J.
Lea 507 ; Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen
499.
But a conspiracy to control the will of
another by quitting work for him simultaneously is not the only way in which
this object may be accomplished. In the
buying and selling of commodities a combination of persons may arrange their
terms of doing business or refuse to deal
with another, with an intent to ruin him.
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This, it will be seen, is one form of a
boycott. But the boycott is the same as
a strike or lockout in principle. Whether
the combination to coerce or prejudice
another be by refusing to deal with him
or to work for him, the same rules apply. But while the principle of the law
is the same, yet in practice the boycott
presents the evil aspects of a strike in a
more aggravated form. It seems to be
peculiarly ill adapted to American institutions. A strike more frequently has
something to do with the real issue in
dispute. Often it may be regarded as a
mere incident in striking a bargain. The
workmen offer towork on certain terms.
But the employer says he will not accept
the offer, so the workmen say that they
will wait till he does accept. Strikes
generally have other elements than this;
but they may be, and often are, nothing
more. The boycott, however, is usually
introduced as a side issue. The boycotter seldom or never has any fault to find
with a salesman's goods. The direct
transaction between the parties is entirely lost sight of. The boycott is applied in order to coerce him in regard to
some entirely different matter. It is a
peculiar species of industrial warfare,
which, as generally conducted, is highly
criminal, and. which public opinion universally condemns. Often the boycotters have a man so in their power that
they freely extort money from him, thus
making the offence more atrocious. In
the celebrated Theiss boycott in New
York city, offensive circulars were distributed in front of the victim's place of
business. Pressure was so brought to
bear that the supplies necessary to carry
on his business were refused. And rain
was only averted by the payment of a
large sum of money. Surely, when a
boycott is carried to such an extent, it
must be a flagrant violation of the law.
The English case of Mogul S. S. Co.
v. McGregor, 5 Q. B. Div. 476, a civil
action in the Queen's Bench Division,
decided in 1885, involved a peculiar

species of boycotting. This was an action the parties to which were the respective owners of ships plying between
England and China. The defendants sn
that case had conspired to ruin the
plaintiff's business by allowing certain
discounts to those who would deal with
them exclusively. The plaintiffs had
applied for an interlocutory injunction
pending the trial restraining the paid
acts of defendants. It was held that this
was not a proper case for an injunction,
on the ground that the injury was not
irreparable and for other reasons. CorsRmGE, C. J., however, who delivered the
opinion of the court, said: I It is certainly conceivable that such a conspiracy
-because conspiracy undoubtedly it isas this might be proved in point of fact:
and I do not entertain any doubt, nor
does my learned brother, that, if such a
conspiracy were proved in point of fact,
and the intuitus of the conspirators were
made out to be, not the mere honest support and maintenance of the defendant's
trade, but the destruction of the plaintiff's trade, and their consequent ruin as
merchants, it would be an offence for
which an indictment for conspiracy,
and, if an indictment, then an action
for conspiracy would lie."
The recent cases in this country which
have been decided as to the legality of
the form of strikes and boycotts now
under consideration have been very decided in prpnouncing them illegal.
Besides the principal case, we have
the case of State v. Glidden, 3 New Eng.
Rep. 849, which was decided April 1,
1887, by the Supreme Court of Connecticut--a case in which the defendants
had sought to procure the discharge of
certain workmen by leaving work in a
body, and where they had sought to further enforce demands by a boycottCARNTER, J., in delivering the opinion
of the Court, held these acts criminal by
local statute. Bat he also discussed the
common law of conspiracy, and found
the acts of defendants equally unlawful

OLD DOMINION STEAMSHIP CO. v. MoKENNA.
at common law. He said : "It seems
strange in a country in which law interferes so little with the liberty of the individual, that it should be necessary to
announce from the bench that every man
may carry on his business as he pleases,
may do what he will with his own, so
long as he does nothing unlawful and
"acts with due regard td the rights of
others, and that the occasion for such an
announcement should be, not an attempt
by government to interfere with the
rights of citizens, nor by the rich and
powerful to oppress the poor, but an attempt by a large body of workingmen to
control, by means little if any better
than force, the action of employers. The
defendants and their associates said to
the Carrington Publishing Company:
4You shall discharge the men you have
in your employ, and shall hereafter employ only such men as we shall name.
It is true we have no interest in your
business; we have no capital to invest
therein ; we are in no wise responsible
for its success, and we do not participate
in its profits, yet we have a right to control its management and compel you to
submit to our direction.' The bare assertion of such a right is startling. * * *
Suppose the government should assert
the right in the same manner to regulate
and control the business affairs of the
Carrington Publishing Company, and
other business enterprises, how long
would the people submit to it? And
yet the exercise of such a power by government would be far more tolerable
than its exercise would be by secret organizations, however wise and intelligent such organizations 'may be,-for
government is established by the people
and is responsible to all the people. * * *
They (the laborers) had a right to ask
the Carrington Publishing Company to
discharge its workmen and employ themselves, and to use all proper arguments
in support of their request. But they
had not the right to say, ' you shall do
this or we will rain your business.'

Much less had they a right to ruin its
business. In such a case the direct and
primary object must be regarded as the
destruction of the business. The fact
that it is designed as a means to an
end, and that end in itself considered a
lawful one, does not divest the transaction of its criminality."
Thus the courts of this country seem
to be settling down to the* conclusion,!
that a conspiracy to coerce or prejudice
one in his busineds, even though there be
no violence, is unlawful. The courts,
however, are very careful in applying
this rule. The purpose of the combination must be shown to be wrongful. It
is, perhaps, by considering the strict application of this rule that the case of
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Mlet. 11 1, in
Massachusetts can be distinguished from
the cases already cited. In that case
a number of journeymen boot-makers
formed a club, one of the regulations of
which was that no member should work
for a manufacturer who employed any
one not a member of that club. It was
held that this was not per se unlawful.
Said SHAW, C. J. : " Stripped, then,
of these introductory recitals and alleged
injurious consequences, and of the qualifying epithets attached to the facts, the
averment is this, that the defendants and
others formed themselves into a society,
and agreed not to work for any person
who should employ any journeyman or
other person not a member of such society, after notice given him to discharge
such workman. The manifest intent of
the association is to induce all those engaged in the same occupation to become
members of it. Such a purpose is not
unlawful. It would give them a power
which might be exerted for useful and
honorable purposes or for dangerous and
pernicious ones. If the latter were the
real and actual object, and susceptible
of proof, it should have been specially
charged. Such an association might be
used to afford each other assistance in
times of poverty, sickness and distress; or
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to raise their intellectual, moral and social condition ; or to make improvement
in their art ; or for other proper purposes. Or the association might be designed for purposes of oppression and
injustice. But in order to charge all
those who become members of an association with the guilt of a criminal conspiracy, it must be averred and proved
that the actual, if not the avowed object
of the association was criminal." In
speaking of this case, BEASLny, J., in
State v. Donaldson, cited supra, held
that the case was clearly distinguishable.
He said: " I concur entirely as well
with the principles embodied in the opinion which was read in the case as in the
result which was attained. The foundation of the "indictment in that case was
the formation of a club by journeymen
boot-makers, one of the regulations of
which was, that no person belonging to
it should work for any master workman
who should employ any journeyman .or
other workman who should not be a
member of such club. Such a combination does not appear to possess any feature of illegality, for the law will not
intend, without proof, that it was formed
for the accomplishment of any illegal
end. * * * The force of this association
was not concentrated with a view to be
-exerted to oppress any individual, and it
was consequently entirely unlike the case
of men who take advantage of their position to use the power, by a concert of
action, which such position gives them,
to compel their employer to a certain
line of conduct. The object of the club
was to establish a general rule for the
regulation of its members ; but the object
of the combination, in the case now before this court, was to occasion a particular result which was mischievous, and
by means which were oppressive. The
two cases are not parallel, and must be
governed by entirely different considerations."
Again, as illustrating the strictness
with which the courts regard the rule

making combinations criminal where
force is not threatened, it was said irt
Pennsylvania, that when the laborers
form a conspiracy to prejudice their employers, that it was lawful for the employers to combine to resistthe conspiracy.
It was held that the motive determined
the illegality of the act. "A combination to resist oppression, not merely supposed but real,would be perfectly innocent
-for, where the act to be done and the
means of accomplishing it are lawful,
and the object to be attained is meritorious, combination is not conspiracy. It
is a fair employment of means not criminal in the abstract, but only so when
directed to the attainment of a criminal
object; and it is therefore idle to say the
law affords a remedy to which the parties
must recur: the legal remedy is cumulative, and does not take away the preventive remedy by the acts of the parties.
It would be an assumption of the question to say it is criminal to do a lawful
act by unlawful means, when the object
must determine the character of the
means :" GimsoN, J., in Commonwealth
v. Carlisle, Bright 42.
There has been much talk of late in
reference to conspiracies which have for
their object the controlling of prices of
the various staples in the markets. The
combinations which are everywhere
making their appearance to control the
prices of the necessities of life are no
doubt extremely prejudicial to the public.
We have before shown that by the old
English common law and statuteq all
combinations to raise prices were criminal. So, also offences of this general
nature even when committed by one person, as engrossing, forestalling and
regrating were criminal both by statute
and by common law. 4 Bl. Com. 158.
But these offences have been modified by
statute in England and also in many of
the American states. But where the
common law of this subject has not been
specifically abolished by statute "modem
ideas of trade have practically abrogated
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some common-law doctrines which are
supposed to unduly hamper commerce."
CAPBELL, J., in Raymond v. Leavitt,
46 Mich. 447. Yet where there is a
combination it would seem that there is
more reason to regard the proceeding as
criminal. In Pennsylvania an action
was brought to recover on a contract to
suspend the deliveries and sales of coal.
This contract was declared void as being
in restraint of trade; and AGNEW, J.,
held that it was criminal to enter into
such a combination, although his remarks
most be considered obiter in this case.
He said: " Singly each might have suspended deliveries and sales of coal to
suit its own interests, and might have
raised the price, even though this might
have been detrimental to the public interest. * * * But here is a conibination of
all the companies operating in the Blossburg and Barclay mining regions, and
controlling their entire production. They
have combined together to govern the
supply and the price of coal in all the
markets from the Hudson to the Mississippi rivers, and from Pennsylvania to
the Lakes. This combination has a
power in its confederated form which no
individual action can confer. The public
interest must succumb to it, for it has
left no competition free to correct its
baleful influence. When the supply of
coal is suspended, the demand for it
becomes importunate, and prices must
rise.
Or if the supply goes forward,
the price fixed by the confederates must
accompany it. The domestic hearth, the
furnaces of the iron master, and the fires
of the manufacturer, all feel the restraint,
while many dependent hands are paralyzed, and hungry mouths are stinted.
The influence of a lack of supply or a
rise in the price of an article of such
prime necessity, cannot be measured. It
permeates the entire mass of the community, and leaves few of its members
untouched by its withering blight. Such
a combination is more than a contract, it
is an offence. * * * Every ' corner,'

in the language of the day, whether it be
to affect the price of articles of commerce,
such as breadstuffs, or the price of vendible stocks, when accomplished by confederation to raise or depress the price
and operate on the market, is a conspiracy. The ruin often spread abroad by
these heartless conspiracies is indescribable, frequently filling the land with starvation, poverty and woe." Morris Run
Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Penn.
St. 186. See also, Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio 349 ; Raymond v. Leavitt,
46 Mich. 447 ; People v. Fisher, 14
Wend. 9. It would seem, however, that
a mere combination of individuals to
agree to ask a certain price for a commodity is not per se criminal. Such a
doctrine would not be in harmony with
the law in regard to labor combinations
and would not suit the general spirit of
our commercial institutions. But where
a combination is formed, the manifest
effect of which is to greatly prejudice the
public; where the entire product of a
great staple, as, for instance, coal, is centered in the control of a single combination, it could hardly be urged that there
is not enough of the old common law
in force to punish such a combination,
This question is likely to become very
important in the future, as there is great
dissatisfaction with the doings of such
combinations, and there is an inclination
to make them answer for their conduct
in the courts if possible.
Where the element of fraud enters in,
however, the combination is generally
criminal. A conspiracy to defraud is in
many cases held criminal, when, if the
fraud were committed by one, no criminal
proceeding could be instituted : Bish. Cr.
Law (7th ed.) 198, and cases there cited.
And to defraud the public is regarded as
even more culpable than to defraud an
individual. In Rex v. De Berenger, 3
M. & S. 67 (see also Reg. v. Gurney, 11
Cox C. C. 414 ; Rex v. Roberts, I Camp.
399 ; Commonwealth v. Supt. Phrdelphia County Prison, 6 Phila. 169; &Semp-
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son Y. ,Shaw, 101 Mass. 145 ; Rex v.Stenson, 12 Cox C:0 . 111), a leading case
upon this subject, it was held that a combination to raise the price of the public
funds by circulating false rumors was
criminal. The corners which are conducted on 'change are often in fraud of
the public, and are a very heinous form
of criminal conspiracies.
Again, the
conspiracies which are often resorted to,
to depress the value of stocks possess the
most revolting degree of culpability.
For instance, a number of persons who
have been elected directors of a railroad
company enter deliberately into a conspirracy to betray the trust reposed in them.
The road is to be saddled with debts, its
credit ruined and the innocent purchaser
of the stock forced to part with it at a
great loss. Such combinations are unquestionably criminal conspiracies.
Concluding Considerations.-Itis often
said that the law is made for the rich
man, and that it has little regard for the
poor man. This has been said especially of late in regard to the law of conspiracy. It may be that thellaw is more
often enforced against the poor man.
But as regards the law itself, an examination of the authorities negatives this
idea. It is only when the workingman
seeks to interfere with the rights of others
that the strong arm of the law is called
upon to intervene. And, strange as it
may seem, the cases in which the combinations of workmen become unlawful are
very often where they seek to procure
the discharge of fellow-workmen. Yet
such an attack is as much an attack upon
labor as it is upon capital. Every workman should have a right to adopt such
means us he may deem best to better his
condition. Often the measures adopted
by labor unions are of more injury to the
laborer than they are to the employer.
No labor union has a right to coerce a
laborer to join it by threats of depriving
him of his means of making a livelihood
and reducing him to beggary. It is a
form of despotism which can never be

tolerated. Nor would the honest business man be at all prejudiced by the enforcement of the law which prohibits
corrupt conspiracies for controlling markets. A free market, where any man
may buy or sell in good faith, is of great
importdnce to the business community;
and the Stock Exchange and the Board
of Trade, so far as they supply a free
market, are among the most valuable of
our business institutions. But, notwithstanding the enormous benefits of these
institutions, we find that among the people they arc looked upon with distrust.
It is because, among other reasons, of
the criminal conspiracies which are
known to be entered into within their
walls. It would be better for the public
-better also for reputable brokers in
Wall street-if the law in regard to this
form of conspiracies were more often
enforced. As a whole, the law of conspiracy presents a just and equitable
department of our jurisprudence. Each
citizen is alike protected in his rights.
Each is made subject to the legal restraint
when he fails to show due regard for the
rights of others. Still it should be remembered that the decisions upon which
the law is grounded are some of them
old English cases which are meagerly
reported, that much of the authority ordinarily cited consists of dicta and nisi
prius decisions, and that there are many
decisions of courts of last resort which it
is difficult to harmonize with the weight
of authority. Then, the law upon this
subject appears to many to be contrary
to some of the general maxims which
have been accepted as a guide in our
policy. The people of this country are
very jealous when their freedom of combination is even seemingly interfered
with, and they may not always see the
justice of decisions which are founded
upon authority which is the least doubtful. Our legislature, then, should enact
delaratory statutes, declaring as accurately as may be just, what combinations
are legal and what illegal. And this
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formal legislative declaration, broadly
interpreted by our courts, with due regard to our peculiar institutions, would

set at rest much controversy as to the
legal right of capital and labor.
HAlaisox H. BtAcE.

SuTreme Court of the United States.
Ex PARTE BAIN,

JR.

The declaration of Article V. of the Amendments to the Constitution, that "no
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise, infamous, crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury," is jurisdictional, and no court
of the United States has authority to try a prisoner without indictment or presentment in such cases.
The indictment here referred to is the presentation to the proper court, under oath,
by the grand jury, duly impanelled, of a charge describing an offence against the
law for which the party charged may be punished.
When this indictment is filed with the court, no change can be made in the body
of the instrument by order of the court, or by the prosecuting attorney, without a
resubmission of the case to the grand jury. And the fact that the court may deem
the change immaterial, as striking out of surplus words, makes no difference. The
instrument, as thus changed, is no longer the indictment of the grand jury which
presented it.
This was the doctrine of the English courts under the common law. It is the
uniform ruling of the American courts, except where statutes prescribe a different
rule, and it is the imperative requirement of the provision of the constitution above
recited, which would be of little avail if an indictment once found can be changed
by the prosecuting officer, with the consent of the court, to conform to their views of
the necessities of the case.
Upon an indictment so changed the court can proceed no further. There is nothing
in the language of the constitution, which the prisoner can "be held to answer."
A trial on such indictment is void. There is nothing to try.
According to principles long settled in this court the prisoner, who stands
sentenced to the penitentiary for such trial, is entitled to his discharge by writ of
habeas corpus.

ONq Petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-This is an application to this court for a writ of
habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner, George M. Bain, Jr., from
the custody of Thomas W. Scott, United States Marshal for the
Eastern District of Virginia. The original petition set out with
particularity proceedings in the Circuit Court of the United States
for that district, in which the petitioner was convicted under Section 5209 of the Revised Statutes, of having made a false report
or statement as cashier of the Exchange National Bank of NorMILLER,
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folk, Virginia. The petition has annexed to it as an exhibit all the
proceedings, so far as they are necessary in the case, from the order
for the impanelling of a grand jury to the final judgment of the
court sentencing the prisoner to imprisonment for five years in the
Albany penitentiary. Upon this application the court directed a
rule to be served upon the marshal to show cause why the writ
should not issue, to which that officer made the following return :
" Comes the said Scott, as marshal aforesaid, and states that there
is no sufficient showing made by the said Bain that he is illegally
held and confined in custody of respondent; but, on the contrary,
his confinement is under the judgment and sentence of a court
having competent jurisdiction to indict and try him, and he should
not be released; andrespondent prays the judgment of this court,
that the rule entered herein against him be discharged, and the
prayer of the petition be denied." The Attorney-General of the
United States, and the District Attorney for the Eastern District
of Virginia, appeared in opposition to the motion, and thus the
merits of the case were fully presented upon the application for the
issue of the writ.
Upon principles which may be considered to be well settled in
this court, it can have no right to issue this writ as a means of
reviewing the judgment of the circuit court simply upon the ground
of error in its proceedings ; but if it shall appear that the court
had no jurisdiction to render the judgment which it gave, and
under which the petitioner is held a prisoner, it is within the power
and it will- be the duty of this court to order his discharge. The
jurisdiction of that court is denied in this case upon two principal
grounds. The first of these relates to matters connected with the
impanelling of the grand jury, and its competency to find the indictment under which the petitioner was convicted; the second refers
to a change made in the indictment, after it was found, by striking
out some words in it, and then proceeding to try the prisoner upon
the indictment as thus changed. We will proceed to examine the
latter ground first.
Section 5209 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, under
which this indictment is found, reads as follows : "Every president, director, cashier, teller, clerk, or agent of any association, who
embezzles, abstracts or wilfully misapplies any of the moneys, funds
or credits of the association ; or who, without authority from the
directors, issues or puts in circulation any of the notes of the asso-
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ciation ; or who, without such authority, issues or puts forth any
certificate of deposit, draws any order or bill of exchange, makes
any acceptance, assigns any note, bond, draft, bill of exchange,
mortgage, judgment, or decree; or who makes any false entry in
any book, report or statement of the association, with intent, in
either case, to injure or defraud the association, or any other company, body politic or corporate, or any individual person, or to
deceive any officer of the association or any agent appointed to examine the affairs of any such association; and every person who
with like intent aids or abets any officer, clerk or agent in any violation of this section-shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and shall be imprisoned not less than five years or more than ten."
Section 5211 requires every banking association organized under
this Act of Congress to ",make to the comptroller of the currency not
less than five reports during each year, verified by the oath or affirmatibn of the president or cashier of such association, and attested
by the signatures of at least three of the directors."
The indictment in this case, which contains but a single count,
and is very long, sets out one of- these reports, made on the seventeenth day of March 1885, by the petitioner, as cashier, and Charles
E. Jenkins, John B. Whitehead and Orlando Windsor, as directors,
of the Exchange National Bank of Norfolk, a national banking
association. The indictment also points out numerous false statements in this report, which, it is alleged in the early part of it,
were made "with intent to injure and defraud the said association, and other companies, bodies politic and corporate, and individual persons to the jurors aforesaid unknown, and with the intent
then and there to deceive any agent appointed by the comptroller of
the currency, to examine the affairs of such association. Following this allegation come the specifications of the particulars in
which the report is false, and the concluding part charges that the
defendants, " and each of them, did then and there well know and
believe the said report and statement to be false to the extent and
in the mode and manner above set forth; and that they and each
of them, made said false statement and report in manner and form
as above set forth with intent to deceive the comptroller of the
currency and the agent appointed to examine the affairs of said
association, and to injure, deceive, and defraud the United States
and said association and the depositors thereof, and other banks
and national banking associations, and divers other persons and
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associations to the jurors aforesaid unknown, against the peace
of the United States and their dignity, and contrary to the form
of the statute of the said United States in such cases made and
provided."
The defendants having been permitted to withdraw the pleas of
not guilty, which they had entered, were then allowed to demur to
the indictment, and, as it is important to be accurate in stating what
was done about this demurrer the transcript of the record on that
subject is here inserted :
UnitedStatesv. Geo. H. Bain, Jr., John B. Vhitehead, Orlando
Windsor, and . E. Jenkins. *
"Indictment for making false entries, etc.
"This day came the parties, by their attorneys, pursuant to the
adjournment order entered herein on the 13th day of November
1886, and thereupon the defendants, by their counsel, asked leave
to withdraw the pleas heretofore entered; which *being granted,
they submitted their demurrer to the indictment, which, after argument, was sustained; and thereupon, on motion of the United
States by counsel, the court orders that the indictment be amended
by striking out the words Ithe comptroller of the currency and,'
therein contained. Thereupon, on motion of John B. Whitehead
and C. E. JenkinS, by their counsel, for the severance of trial, it
was ordered by the court that the case be so severed that George
M. Bain, Jr., cashier and director, be tried separately from John
B. Whitehead, Orlando Windsor, and 0. E. Jenkins, directors. Thereupon, the trial of George M. Bain, Jr., was taken up,
and the said defendant, George M. Bain, Jr., entered his plea of
not guilty."
This was done December 13th, 1886, thirteen months after the
presentment of the indictment by the grand jury, and probably
long after it had been discharged. A verdict of guilty was
found against Bain, a motion for a new trial was made, and then
a motion in arrest of judgmeut, both of which were overruled.
The opinion of the circuit judge on the question which we are
about to consider, delivered in overruling the motion, is found in
the record.
The proposition, that in the courts of the United States any part
of the body of an indictment can be amended after it has been
found and presented by a grand jury, either by order of the court,
"
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or on the request of the prosecuting attorney, without being resubmitted to them for their approval, is one requiring serious consideration. Whatever judicial precedents there may have been for
such action in other courts, we are at once confronted with the fifth
of those articles of amendment, adopted early after the Constitution
itself was formed, and which were manifestly intended mainly for
the security of personal rights. This article begins its enumeration of these rights by declaring that "1no person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury," except in a class of cases
of which this is not one. We are thus not left to the requirements
of the common law in regard to the necessity of a grand jury or a
trial jury, but there is the positive and restrictive language of the
great fundamental instrument by which the national government is
organized, that "no person shall be held to answer" for such a
crime, "unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury."
But even at common law it is beyond question that in the English
courts indictments could not be amended. The authorities upon
this subject are numerous and unambiguous. In the great casd of
Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burrow 2527, tried in 1.770, which attracted an
immense deal of public attention, Wilkes, after being convicted by
a jury of having printed and caused to be published a seditious and
scandalous libel, was brought up before the court of king's bench,
on a motion to set aside the verdict, on the ground that an amendment had been made in the language of the information on which
he was tried. In the course of an opinion delivered by Lord MANSFIELD, overruling the motion, he remarks on this subject (page
2569) "that there is a great difference between amending indictments and amending informations. Indictments are found upon
the oaths of a jury, and ought only to be amended by themselves;
but informations are as declarations in the king's suit. An officer
of the crown has the right of framing them originally; he may, with
leave, amend in like manner as any plaintiff may do." Mr. Justice
YATES, on the same occasion, said that indictments, being upon
oath, can not be amended.
Hawkins, in his Pleas of the Crown, book 2, c. 25, § 97, says:
" take it to be settled that no criminal prosecution is within the
benefit of any of the statutes of amendments; from whence it follows that no amendment can be admitted in any such prosecution,
but such only as is allowed by the common law. And agreeably
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hereto I find it laid down as a principle in some books, that the
body of an indictment removed into the king's bench from any inferior court whatsoever, except only those of London, can in no
case be amended. But it is said that the body of an indictment
from Lojndon may be amended, because, .by the city charter, a tenor
of the record only can be removed from thence." He further says,
in section 98 : "It seems to have been anciently the common
practice where an indictment appeared to be insufficient, either for
its uncertainty or the want of proper legal words, not to put the
defendant to answer it; but if it were found in the same county in
which the court sat, to award process against the grand jury to come
into court and amend it. And it seems to be the common practice
at this day, while the grand jury who found a bill is before the
court, to amend it, by their consent, in a matter of form, as the name
or addition of the party."
This language is repeated in Starkie, Crim. P1. 287. There are,
however, several cases in which it has been decided that the caption of an indictment may be amended, and we, therefore, give here
the language of Starkie (page 258), as describing what is meant by
the phrase " caption of an indictment." "Where an inferior court,"
he says, "in obedience to a writ of certiorari from the king's bench,
transmits the indictment to the crown office, it is accompanied with
the formal history of the proceeding describing the court before
which the indictment was found, the jurors by whom it was found,
and the time and place where it was found. This instrument,
termed a schedule, is annexed to the indictment, and both are sent
to the crown office. The history of the proceedings, as copied or
extracted from the schedule, is called the caption, and is entered of
It will be seen that,
record, immediately before the indictment."
.instrument found
of
the
is
no
part
as thus explained, the caption
by the grand jury.
Wharton, in his work on Criminal Pleading and Practice, § 90,
says : "No inconsiderable portion of the difficulties in the way of
the criminal pleader at common law have been removed in England
by 7 Geo. IV., c. 64, §§ 20, 21; 11 & 12 Vict. c. 46, and 14 &
15 Vict. 100 ; and in most of the states of the American Union,
by statutes containing similar provisions." He also cites cases in
the English courts, where amendments have been made under
those statutes, but they can have no force as authority in this coun-
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try, even if they permitted such amendments as the one under consideration.
No authority has been cited to us in the American courts which
sustains the right of a court to amend any part of the body of an
indictment without reassembling the grand jury, unless by virtue
of a statute. On the contrary, in the case of Com. v. Child, 13
Pick. 200, Chief Justice SHAw says: "It is a well settled rule
of law that the statute respecting amendments does not extend to
indictments; that a defective indictment cannot be aided by a verdict; and that an indictment had on demurrer must be held insufficient upon a motion in arrest of judgment."
In the case of Com. v. lJahar,16 Pick. 120, the court having
held, upon the arraignment of the defendant, that the indictment
was defective, the Attorney-General moved to amend it, and the
prisoner's counsel consented that the name of William Hayden, as
the owner of the house in which the offence had been committed,
should be inserted, not intending, however, to admit that Hayden
was, in fact, the owner. "But the court were of opinion that this
was a case in which an amendment could not be allowed, even with
the consent of the prisoner."
In the case of Com. v. Drew, 3 Cush. 279, Chief Justice SHlAw
said: "Where it is found that there is some mistake in an indictment, as a wrong name or addition, or the like, and the grand jury
can be again appealed to, as there can be no amendment of an indictment by the court, the proper course is for the grand jury to
return a new indictment, avoiding the defects of the first."
In the case of State v. Sexton, 3 Hawks 184, the Supreme Court
of that state said: "It is a familiar rule that the indictment
should state that the defendant committed the offence on a specific
day and year, but it is unnecessary to prove, in any case, the precise day and year, except where the time enters into the nature of
the offence. But if the indictment lay the offence to have
been committed on an -impossible day, or on a future day, the objection is as fatal as if no time at all had been inserted. Nor are
indictments within the operation of the statutes of jeofails, and can
not therefore be amended. Being the finding of a jury upon oath,
the court cannot amend without the concurrence of the grand jury
by whom the bill is found. These rules are too plain to require
authority, and show that the judgment of the court was right, and
must be affirmed." It will be perceived that the amendment in
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that case had reference to a matter which the law did not require
to be proved, as it was alleged, and which to that extent was
not material. The same proposition was held in the New York
Court of General Sessions, in the case of -People v. Campbell,
4 Parker Crim. -R. 387, where it was laid down that the averments in an indictment could not be changed, even by consent of
defendant.
The learned judge who presided in the circuit court at the time
the change was made in this indictment, says that the court allowed
the words " comptroller of the currency and," to be stricken out as
surplusage, and required the defendant to plead to the indictment
as it then read. The opinion which he rendered on the motion in
arrest of judgment, referring to this branch of the case, rests the
validity of the court's action in permitting the change of the indictment upon the ground that the words stricken out were surplusage,
and were not at all material to it, and that no injury was done to
the prisoner by allowing such change to be made. He goes on to
argue that the grand jury would have found the indictment without
this language. But it is not for the court to say whether they would
or not. The party can only be tried upon an indictment as found
by such grand jury, and especially upon all its language found in
the charging part of that instrument. While it may seem to the
court, with its better instructed mind in regard to what the statute
requires to be found as to the intent to deceive, that it was neither
necessary nor reasonable that the grand jury should attach importance to thb fact that it was the comptroller who was to be deceived,
yet it is not impossible nor very improbable that the grand jury
looked mainly to that officer as the party whom the prisoner intended to deceive by a report which was made upon his requisition
and returned directly to him. As we have already seen, the statute
requires these reports to be made to the comptroller at least five
times a year, and the averment of the indictment is that this report
was made and returned to the officer in response to his requisition
for it. How can the court say that there may not have been more
than one of the jurors who found this indictment who was satisfied
that the false report was made to deceive the comptroller, but was
not convinced that it was made to deceive anybody else ? And
how can it be said, that with these words stricken out, it is the indictment which was found by the grand jury? If it lies within the
province of a court to change the charging part of an indictment to
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suit its own notions of what it ought to have been, or what the
grand jury would probably have made it if their attention had been
called to suggest changes, the great importance which the common
law attaches to an indictment by a grand jury as a prerequisite to
a prisoner's trial for a crime, and without which the constitution
says "no person shall be held to answer," may be frittered away
until its value is almost destroyed.
The importance of the part played by the grand jury in Eng-.
land can not be better illustrated than by the language of Justice
FIELD, in a charge to a grand jury, reported in 2 Sawy. 667.
"The institution of the grand jury," he says, "1is of very ancient
order in the history of England-it goes back many centuries. For
a long period its powers were not clearly defined; and it would
seem from the accounts of commentators on the laws of that country, that it was first a body which not only accused, but which also
tried, public offenders. However this may have been in its origin,
it was at the time of the settlement of this country an informing
and accusing tribunal only, without whose previous action no person charged with a felony could, except in certain special cases, be
put upon his trial. And in the struggles which at times arose in
England between the powers of the king and the rights of the subject, it often stood as a barrier against persecution in his name ;
until, at length, it came to be regarded as an institution by which
the subject was rendered secure against oppression from unfounded
prosecutions of the crown. In this country, from. the popular
character of our institutions, there has seldom been any contest
between the government and the citizen which required the existence of the grand jury as a protection against oppressive action of
the government. Yet the institution was adopted in this country,
and is continued from considerations similar to those which give to
it its chief value in England, and is designed as a means, pot only
of bringing to trial persons accused of public offences upon just
grounds, but also as a -means of protecting the citizen against unfounded accusation, whether it comes from government, or be
prompted by partisan passion or private enmity. No person shall
be required, according to the fundamental law of the country, except in the cases mentioned, to answer for any of the higher crimes
unless this body, consisting of not less than sixteen nor more
than twenty-three good and lawful men, selected from the body
of the district shall declare, upon careful deliberation under the
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solemnity of an oath, that there is good reason for his accusation
and trial." "
The case of Rurtado v. People, 110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep.
Ill1 was a writ of error to the supreme court of that state by a
party who had been convicted of the crime of murder in the state
court upon an information instead of an indictment. The writ of
error from this court was founded on the proposition that the provision of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United
States, that no state "1shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law," required an indictment as
necesary to due process of law. This court held otherwise, and
that it was within the power of the states to provide punishment of
all manner of crimes without indictment by a grand jury. The
nature and value of a grand jury, both in this country aud in the
English system of law, were much discussed in that case, with reference to Coke, Magna Charta, and to other sources of information
on that subject, both in the opinion of the court and in an exhaustive review of that question by Mr. Justice HARLAN in a dissenting
opinion.
It has been said that, since there is no danger to the citizen from
the oppressions of a monarch, or of any form of executive power,
there is no longer.need of a grand jury. But whatever force may
be given to this argument, it remains true that the grand jury is as
valuable as ever. in securing, in the language of Chief Justice SIIAW,
in the case of Jones v. Bobbins, 8 Gray 329, "individual citizens
from an open and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble,
expense and anxiety of a public trial before a probable cause is established by the presentment and indictment of such a jury; and in
case of high offences it is justly regarded as one of the securities to
the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive public prose•cutions."
It is never to be forgotten that in the construction of the language
of the constitution here relied on,' as, indeed, in all other instances
where construction becomes necessary, we are to place ourselves as
nearly as possible in the condition of the men who framed that instrument. Undoubtedly the framers of this article had for a long
time been absorbed in considering the arbitrary encroachments of
the crown on the liberty of the subject, and were imbued with the
common-law estimate of the value of the grand jury as part of its
s.ystem of criminal jurisprudence. They, therefore, must be un-
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derstood to have used the language which they did in declaring
that no person should be called to answer for any capital or other
wise infamous crime, except upon an indictment or presentment
of a grand jury, in the fall sense of its necessity and of its value.
We are of the opinion that an indictment found by a grand jury
was indispensable to the power of the court to try the petitioner
for the crime with which he was charged. The sentence of the
court was that he should be imprisoned in the penitentiary at
Albany. The case of Ez parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 418, 5 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 935. and the later one of Mackin v. U. S., 6 Id. 777,
establish the proposition that this prosecution was for an infamous
crime within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
It only remains to consider whether this change in the indictment deprived the court of the power of proceeding to try the petitioner and sentence him to the imprisonment provided for in the
statute. We have no difficulty in holding that the indictment on
which he was tried was no indictment of a grand jury. The decisions which we have already referred to, as well as sound principle,
require us to hold that after the indictment was changed it was no
longer the indictment of the grand jury who presented it. Any
other doctrine would place the rights of the citizen, which were
intended to be protected by the constitutional provision, at the
mercy or control of the court or prosecuting attorney; for, if it be
once held that changes can be made by the consent or the order
of the court in the body of the indictment, as presented by the
grand jury, and the prisoner can be called upon to answer to the
indictment as thus changed, the restriction which the constitution
places upon the power of the court, in regard to the prerequisite
to an indictment in reality no longer exists. It is of no avail,
under such circumstances, to say that the court has jurisdiction of
the person and of the crime, for, though it has possession of the
person, and would have jurisdiction of the crime, if it were properly
presented by.indictment, the jurisdiction of the offence is gone, and
the court has no right to proceed any further in the progress of the
case for want of an indictment. If there is nothing before the court
which the prisoner, in the language of the constitution, can be
" held to answer," he is then entitled to be discharged so far as
the offence originally presented to the court by the indictment is
cencerned. The power of the court to proceed to try the prisoner
is as much arrested as if an indictment had been dismissed or a
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nolle prose ,ui had been entered. There was nothing before the
court on which it could hear evidence or pronounce sentence. The
case comes within the principles laid down by this court in Ex parte
Lange, 18 Wall. 163; Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18; Ex parte
Wilson, 114 U. S. 418, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935, and other cases.
These views dispense with the necessity of examining into the
questions argued before us concerning the formation of the grand
jury and its removal from place to place within the district. We
are of opinion that the petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus and it is accordingly granted.
In the particular case the Supreme
Court of the United States reviews the
action of a Circuit Court of the United
States in a criminal case. It is notvery
often that a criminal case finds its way to
the Supreme Court of the United States,
and when it does the decision of that
court is usually worthy of especial attention.
I. The laws of the United States do
not provide for writs of error to the
Supreme Court from final judgments in
any criminalcase. The Circuit Courts of
the United States consequently exercise a
final jurisdiction in criminal cases, even
though life itself may be at stake. While
this is so the particular case shows that
under certain circumstances the action of
the Circuit Courts in criminal cases maybe
reviewed by the Supreme Court. This
case illustrates the principle that while a
writ of error will not lie to enable the
Supreme Court to review a judgment of
a Circuit Courtin a criminal case upon the
ground of error in its proceedings, yet
that court may issue its writ of habeas
corpus and discharge a prisoner held under
an erroneous judgment of the Circuit
Court when it appears that that court had
no jurisdiction to render the judgment.
There is also another mode by which
the Supreme Court may review the
decision of a Circuit Court in a criminal
case. The laws of Congress provide
that whenever any question shall occur
before the Circuit Court, upon which the
opinions of the judges shall be opposed,

the point upon which the disagreement
shall happen shall, during the same term,
upon request of either party, or their
counsel, be stated, under direction of the
judges, and certified, under the seal of
the court, to the Supreme Court, at their
next session to be held thereafter, and
shall by said court be finally decided.
Under this provision that court has in
a number of cases been called upon to
pass on questions of criminal law. But
to enable a question to be thus certified to
the Supreme Court upon a certificate of
a division of opinion, the difference of
opinion mustbe areal one and not merely
pro forma, see Webster v. Cooper, 10
How. 64.
It was at one time matter of great
doubt whether the Supreme Court had a
right to assume this appellate jurisdiction
over the circuit courts by granting writs
of habeas corpus, as above referred to.
Mr. Justice CunTis of that court has said
that great diversity of opinion in reference to the matter existed amongst the
judges of the court. But the famous
case of Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wallace 85
(1868), settled the principle that the court
possessed such appellate power. The
opinion of the Chief Justice in that case
also shows the diversities of opinion
which had existed up to that time in
regard to the matter. The existence of
the power was justified under a provision
of the judiciary act of 1789, authorizing
the court to issue any writ necessary for
the exercise of its jurisdiction.
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The case of Ex porte Royall, i 17 506 (1858) ; and Tarble's Case, 3 Wall.
U. S. 241 (1885), decided that a federal 397 (1871).
court might release on a habeas corpus a
II. The Fifth Amendment of the Conperson held in custody under a state law stitution of the United States provides
in violation of the constitution or laws of
that "no person shall be held to answer
the United States. But it is discretion- for a capital, or otherwise infamous
ary with the court whether it will exercise crime, unless on a presentment or indictthe power. "This court holds that when ment of a grand jury, except in certain
a person is in custody, under process from cases not necessary to be mentioned here.
a state court of original jurisdiction, for The meaning of the word "infamous"
an alleged offence against the laws of such in this provision received an authoritastate, and it is claimed that he is tive exposition in Ex parte Wilson, 114
restrained of his liberty in violation of U. S. 417 (1885). Prior to the decision
the constitution of the United States, the in that case, there had been a number of
circuit court has a discretion, whether it decisions in the federal courts sustaining
will discharge him, upon habeas corpus, prosecutions by information for any crime
in advance of his trial in the court in a conviction of which would not at comwhich he is indicted ; that discretion, mon law have disqualified the convict to
however, to be subordinated to any be a witness: United States v. .Shepard,
special circumstances requiring immedi- I Abbott U. S. 431 (1870); United
ate action. When the state court shall States v. Maxwell, 3 Dillon 275 (1875);
have finally acted upon the case, the United States v. Block, 4 Sawyer 211
circuit court has still a discretion whether (1877); United States v. Miller, 3
under all the circumstances then existing, Hughes 553 (1878); United States v.
the accused, if convicted, shall be put to Baugh, 4 Id. 501 (1880) ; United States
his writ of error from the highest court v. Yates, 6 Fed. Rep. 861 (1881);
of the state, or whether it will proceed
United iates v. -zdd, 21 Blatchf. 330
by writ of habeas corpus, summarily to (1883) ; I re Wilson, 18 Fed R. 33
determine whether the petition is re- (1883).
ButinExparte Wilson, supra,
strained of his liberty in violation of the the Supreme Court declared its opinion
Constitution of the United States." And to be that the competency of the defendthe opinion seems to be that while this is ant, if convicted, to be a witness in ana discretionary power, yet as a general other case, was not the true test, and it
rule it is not well to exercise it in advance held that no person could be held to anof the trial in the state court.
swer without presentment or indictment
While a federal court may release on by a grand jury, for any crime for which
a habeascorpus a prisoner held in custody an infamous punishment could be imunder a state law, a state court cannot posed by the court.
What punishments are to be considered
release a person held in custody under
the laws of the United States. If a writ as " infamous ?" In the case above reof habeas corpus is served by authority ferred to, the Supreme Court, through
of a state court on one, detaining a pri- Mr. Justice Gnaa, writing the opinion,
soner for an offence against the laws of
says: "What punishments shall be conthe United States, it is the duty of the sidered as infamous may be affected by
person on whom it is served to make the changes of public opinion from one
known to the state court the authority age to another. In former times, being
by which the prisoner is held, but at the put in the stocks was not considered as
same time not to obey the process of the necessarily infamous. And by the first
state court: U. S. v. Booth, 21 How. judiciary act of the United States, whip-
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ping was classed with moderate fines and
short terms of iinprisonment. * * * But
at the present day either stocks br whipping might be thought an infamous punishment." The judgment of the court in
that case was that a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term of years at hard
labor was an infamous crime within the
meaning of the constitutional provision
already referred to.
In Mackin v. United States, 117 U. S.
348 (1885), the court re-affirmed the
opinion expressed in Ex parte Wilson,
that imprisonment at hard labor in a state
prison was an infamous punishment, and
in addition thereto held that imprisonment in a state prison or penitentiary,
with or without hard labor, was an infamous punishment. When such a punishment can be imposed, the proceeding
cannot be by information.
The same court, in Hurtadov. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1883), decided that
the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids any state to*" deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law,"
did not require an indictment by a grand
jury in a prosecution for a capital crime
in a state court. The same question had
been before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129,
144 (1872), and had been decided in the
same way. And so, too, was the case
of Kallocrhv. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 229
(1880).
III. The ruling of the court to the
Nfect that an indictment cannot be
amended by the court, is clearly in conformitv to a well established principle of
the common law. The authorities are
cited in the opinion in the particular case,
and it will not be necessary to examine
that subject farther. It is equally plain,
that while at common law an indictment
cannot be amended, the caption of an indictment may be amended, as that is,
strictly speaking, no part of the indictment itself: State v. Williams, 2 McCord (So. C.)301 (1822); State v.Jones,

9 N. J. Law 2 (1827) ; Moodgy. State,
7 Blackf. (Ind.) 424 (1845) ; State v.
McCarty, 3 Pinney (Wis.) 514 (1850) ;
Allen v. State, 5 Vis. 337 (1856); State
v. Useful Manufacturers' Society, 42 N.
J. L. 504 (1880). The common law,
forbidding the amendment of indictments, has been changed in England by
statute, power being given to the courts
to make amendments thereto. See 14
and 15 Vict. c. 100. But it would seem
that the legislative power in this country
could not authorize the courts to make
amendments to indictments in those states
where constitutional provisions secure to
accused persons a trial " on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,"
and not otherwise. Mr. Bishop thinks
it difficult to resist the conclusion, that
"if a statute should authorize a material
amendment to be made in an indictment
for an offence which, by the constitution
of the state was punishable only by indictment, the statutory direction would
be a nullity."
Bishop's Cr. Procedure (2d ed.) 97.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in
1876, in Miller v. State, 53 Miss. 403,
sustained a statute authorizing the amendment of indictments. In the course of
the opinion the court says : "It would
not be competent to change the indictment so as to charge a distinct and different offence from that preferred by the
grand jury; but when the amendment is
merely to state truly the name of the person for an injury to whom .the grand
jury indicted the accused, it is not obnoxious to constitutional objection. The
amendment may be made to state truly
and describe accurately the particular
(the italics are the court's) and identical
offence for which the grandjury indicted,
but not to charge one for which the grand
jury had not indicted. The statute allows the court, on trial of an indictment
for any offence, to cause an amendment
to be made, not to introduce another and
distinct offence, but to accurately describe
and particularly identify, as to names,
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the very offence charged, ' if it shall
consider such variance' (as disclosed by
evidence) I not material to the merits of
the case, and that the defendant cannot
be prejudiced thereby in his defence on
the merits ;' and this is to be on such
terms as to postponing the trial (lest surprise may work injury to the defence) to
be had before the same or another jury,
as such court shall think reasonable; and
the action of the court, both in ordering
an amendment and refusing a continuance on that ground, is made the subject
of review by the Supreme Court. Thus
limited and guarded, we do not think
this power is extra-constitutional. To
make certain and precise the charge in
an indictment is an advantage to the defendant ; and, so long as the exercise of
the power is confined to truly and precisely identifying and particularizing the
very offence indicted for, it violates no
right, and does no harm, provided due
respect is had to the limitations and conditions by which it is guarded by the
statute. It is undoubtedly a very delicate power, and should be employed cautiously and with scrupulous regard to the
defence on the merits, and on such terms
as to preclude the possibility of the
slightest harm to such defence." No
authorities are examined or cited by the
court in its opinion, but the opinion is
followed in Peebles v. State, 55 Miss.
434 (1877), and in Blurnenberg v. State,
55 Miss. 528 (1878).
The Constitution of Michigan provides
that "in every criminal prosecution, the
accused * * * shall be informed of the
nature of the accusation." In Brown
v. People, 29 Mich. 232 (1874) counsel
argued that this provision made it impossible for the legislature to alter in any
respect the common-law form of charging
an offence. The question came up in the
case of an information, informations
taking the place of indictments in Michigan. The opinion of the court was
written by Mr. Justice CHRISTIANCY,
and it concedes that it would not be com-

petent for the legislature to authorize any
form of charging an offence, which should
not inform the accused substantially of
thenature and character of the particular
offence intended to be proved against him,
and then goes on to say: "But this provision of the constitution was not intended
to prevent the legislature from dispensing
with matters of form only, in the description of an offence, nor with any degree
of particularity or specifcation in the
description which did not give the defendant any substantial and reliable information of the particular offence intended to
be proved, and without which he would
receive substantially the same information."
The opinion is also expressed that as a
general rule it would not be competent
for the legislature to authorize a form of
charging the offence by an information,
which would give the defendant less real
and substantial information of the nature
of the offence than was indispensable in
an indictment at common law, but at the
same time the court was not prepared to
say that this was a universal rule applicable to all cases. In the subsequent case
of People v. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 431
(1874), the court again passed on the
same constitutional provision, and held
that statutes simplifying the forms of information must be confined to the omission
only of such matters as are not essential
to give information of the nature of the
accusation.

In McLaughlia v. The State, 45 Ind.
338 (1873) the Supreme Court of Indi.
ana passed on the provision in the con
stitution of that state securing to accused
persons the right "to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him,"
and it held that the legislature had not
the power to dispense with such allegations in an indictment as an essential to
reasonable particularity and certainty in
the description of the offence. In State
v. O'Flaherty,7 Nev. 157 (1871) the
court say : " The power of the legislature
to mould and fashion the form of an in-
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dictnient is plenary. Its substance, however, cannot bh dispensed with."
On this same subject we would call
attention to the following cases. Leasure
v. State, 19 Ohio St. 49 (1869) ; State
v. Manning, 14 Texas 402 (1855) ; Peo-

ple Y. Mortimer, 46 Cal. 114 (1873) ;
State v. Learned, 47 Me. 426 (1859) ;
State v. Corson, 59 Id. 137 (1871);
Corn. v. Holley, 3 Gray 458 (1855),
HENRY WAE RoERs.

Court of Appeals of New York.
GIFFARD, RECEIVER, V. CORRIGAN, EXECUTOR.
The bare fact that a deed has been recorded is not sufficient evidence that it was
delivered by the grantor, or accepted by the grantee or beneficiary. To establish
these facts there must be other and further evidence that will support such a presumption, as that the deed would operate beneficially to the grantee, or that he had
knowledge of the execution or recording of the deed.

THE opinion of the court was delivered by
ANDREWS, J.-The defendant McOloskey, in his verified answer,
denied that he entered into the covenant of assumption contained
in the deed executed by McEvoy, and alleged that the deed was
made and executed without his knowledge, and that it was never
delivered to or accepted by him. The parties proceeded to trial
upon the issue so presented, and the other issues in the case. The
plaintiff put in evidence from the register's office in West Chester
county, the record of a deed dated May 8th 1878, recorded May
10th 1878, from McEvoy to the defendant, McOloskey, purporting
to convey to "John McCloskey, Archbishop of New York," for
the nominal consideration of one dollar, the mortgaged premises
and a lot adjacent thereto, which deed contained a covenant on the
part of the grantee, to assume and pay the principal sum of $3900
on the mortgage, with interest from January 9th 1869. The deed
was executed by the grantor alone. The plaintiff rested his case
against the defendant, McOloskey, solely upon the record. The
case is bare of any circumstance or evidence showing, or tending
to show, that the defendant, McCloskey, had any knowledge or
information of the existence of the deed, or indeed of the existence
of the mortgaged property prior to the commencement of the
action, or that he was ever in possession, or that he ever had any
conversation or negotiation with any one in respect to the property.
There is no evidence who put the deed upon record, or how it came
to be recorded. The bare fact of the record is all that appears
connecting the defendant, McOloskey, with the transaction. The
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grantor, McEvoy, died before the commencement of the action, and
the defendant, MVcCloskey. a few months after the trial.
In determining the question whether the plaintiff made out a
*rimafacie case of the delivery to and acceptance of the deed by
the grantee, certain other facts need to be noticed. McEvoy was
a Roman Catholic priest. He acquired title to the mortgaged property in 1870, from the trustees of the Father Matthew Temperance
Benefit Association of Tuckahoe, a society incorporated under the
Act of April 12th 1848, for the incorporation of benevolent,
charitable, scientific and missionary societies. The conveyance of
the property by the society to McEvoy was made under the order
of the court, which authorized the conveyance to be made to him,
"for the use of the Roman Catholic Church or the people of
Tuckahoe ;" and the deed referred to the order as the authority
under which it was executed. It appeared by the petition upon
which the order was granted that the society was unable to pay the
mortgage, and that the value of the premises did not exceed the
amount due thereon. The plaintiff, to maintain his claim that
the deed from McEvoy to McCloskey was delivered and accepted,
invokes the presumption that a party has accepted a benefit
attempted to be conferred upon him, and that the record of a deed
beneficial to the grantee is primafacie evidence of its delivery.
The property was conveyed to McEvoy for church purposes, and
it cannot be doubted that in executing a deed to the defendant,
McCloskey, it was his intention to vest the title in him as archbishop for the same purposes, whatever may be the legal effect of
his conveyance, and not to vest in his grantee a personal beneficial
interest in the property. It is well known that the title to church
property in the Roman Catholic Church is frequently vested in the
bishop. This tends to explain a transaction which would otherwise
be peculiar, and how McEvoy may have executed a deed of the
land to his ecclesiastical superior without his knowledge.
The ground of the presumption, from the bare record of a deed,
that it has been delivered and accepted wholly fails in this case.
The deed was not beneficial to the grantee. The property was
heavily encumbered, probably to its full value. As has been stated,
there is no evidence of any possession under the deed, or of any
prior contract or negotiation between the parties, or of any
knowledge in fact on the part of the grantee of the existence of the
conveyance. In most of the cases where delivery of a deed has
VOL. XXXV.-57
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been sought to be established without proof of the actual fact, there
are circumstances which support the presumption of a delivery, in
addition to the bare record of the deed.
We are of the opinion that, under the circumstances of this case,
a delivery cannot be presumed from the record alone, and that the
conclusion of the general term upon this point was correct. See
Jackson v. Phipps, 12 Johns. 418; Jackson v. Bodle, 20 Id.
184; Church v. Gilman, 15 Wend. 656; Elsey v. Jetcalf, 1
Denio 323. Contra, .Bathbunv. Rathbun, 6 Barb. 98.
Construing the exceptions in connection with the issue raised by
the pleadings, we think they fairly presented the question whether
the evidence justified a finding that the defendant, McCloskey,
made the covenant upon which be is sought to be charged. But as
the case on this point may be changed on a re-trial, we think the
court below should have ordered a new trial, and that its order
should be modified in this respect.
There is another question argued by counsel, of great interest,
which we do not deem it necessary to decide, as it m-ay not again
arise. The question relates to the effect of the release from the
covenant of assumption executed by the executor of McEvoy to
McCloskey, after the complaint in the action and the notice of lis
pendens had been filed, but before the actual service of process on
the defendant. Is it competent for a grantor of mortgaged premises
whose conveyance was made subject to the mortgage, and contains
a covenant of assumption by the grantee, without the consent of the
mortgagee-to release the grantee from the covenant so as to bar any
remedy thereon against him by the mortgagee ? And does it make
any difference whether the release is executed before or after the
mortgagee has notice of the covenant, or before or after suit commenced by him thereon. This question has never been finally
adjudicated in this court, although expressions of judges are to be
found bearing upon it: Etrtley v. .arrison, 24 N. Y. 170 ; Garnsey v. Bogers, 47 Id. 233; .Dunningv. Leavitt, 85 Id. 30; Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 78 Id. 150.
Prior to Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178, as is shown by RAPALLO,
J., in Garnsey v. Bogers, the right of a mortgagee to avail himself of the benefit of a covenant of payment made by a grantee of
the mortgagor was regarded as an equitable right only, and was
founded on the theory that " the undertaking of the grantee to pay
off the encumbrance is a collateral security acquired by the mort-
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gagor, which inures by an equitable subrogation to the benefit of
the mortgagee." DENio, J., in Burr v. Beers. Assuming this to
be the true foundation of the rule, the question arises, when does
this equitable right of subrogation attach ? It is clear that it cannot be enforced by the mortgagee until default of the covenantor to
pay the mortgage according to the terms of his covenant. But
does not the equitable right of the creditor to the benefit of the
covenant spring into existence cotemporaneously with the covenant
itself, although he cannot then avail himself of it, and although he
may never be in a situation which renders a resort to it necessary.
This right does not rest on privity of contract between the covenantor and mortgagee. It is the application of an equitable principle long recognised, to work out the real justice of the transaction. If the right of the creditor to the collateral security springs
into existence concurrently with the origin of the relation of principal and surety, between the mortgagor and his grantee, ought the
immediate parties to the covenant, by a mere release, to be permitted to change the situation of the mortgagee, and deprive him
of the security of the covenant ? It is true that there is no direct
contract with the mortgagee, nor is there any consideration moving
between the mortgagee and covenantor. But does the absence of the
consideration between these parties justify the mortgagor in cancelling a security which he has taken for his own protection, and
which, at the same time, operates also as a protection to his creditors, and especially when this is done for the mere purpose of defeating the remedy of the latter. The case of Burr v. Beers,
established the doctrine in this state that an action at law would lie
in favor of the mortgagee against the grantee of the mortgagor on
the covenant of assumption. Would the defence of a release be
available when the action is in this form, assuming that it would
not be available in the equitable action? In truth is the direct
action on the covenant not an action founded upon the equity of
the transaction, rather than upon the notion of a contract between
the parties ? We leave the question raised by the release in this
case undecided. We prefer not to decide it until it is squarely and
necessarily presented.
The order and judgment of the General Term should be modified
by directing a new trial, and as so modified, affirmed, with costs to
abide the event.
The authorities do not assert the rule

something more than the act of recording

as above laid down, that there must be

a deed, to constitute a delivery; but
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hold that recording, or filing for record,
is primafacie evidence of delivery-because that act shows that the grantor
intended a delivery, and, in the absence
of anything to the contrary, should have
effect. Delivery is presumed, from the
act of recording or filing for record:
Guilbert v. Ins. Co., 23 Wend. 43;
Bulkley v. Bufflngton, 5 McL. 457;
Bulldey v. Carleton, 6 Id. 125 ; Mitchell
v. Ryan, 3 0. St. 377. Not an actual
delivery, nor conclusive evidence of a
delivery, Eames v. Phipps, 12 Johns.
418 ; Hawkes v. Pike, 105 Mass. 560 ;
but a presumptiveor primafacie delivery,
to stand until rebutted, or some other
fact, or intention is shown: Lawrencev.
Farley, 24 Hun 293; Younge v. Guilbeau, 3 Wall. 636 ; Rigler v. Cloud, 14
Pa. St. 361 ; .Kille v. Eye, 79 Id. 15 ;
Chess v. Chess, I P. & W. 32; Boardman v. Dean, 34 Pa. St, 252 ; Fan Valen
v. Schemerhorn, 22 How. Pr. 416; Wilsey
v. Dennis, 44 Barb. 354. What facts
are sufficient to rebut this presumptionthis primafacie delivery-and show that
there was no delivery, and no intention
to deliver, depends upon the facts of
each case: Knolls v. Barnhart, 71 N. Y.
474 ; Thompson v. Jones, 1 Head 576 ;
Deitz v. Farish, 79 N. Y. 520. For instance, if the grantee gets possession
of the deed by fraud or after the death of
the grantor, and procures the recordation, there is no delivery: Critchfield v.
Critchfidd, 24 Pa. St. 100; Yan Amtinge v. Morton, 4 Whart. 382 ; Ritter
v. Worth, 58 N. Y. 627 ; Martinv. Ramsey, 5 Humph. 349. Or where the registration was done upon certain conditions,
in which case the onus is on the grantor:
Thompson v. Jones, 1 Head 575 ; Watson v. Ryan, 3 Tenn. Ch. 40. And where
a parent executed a deed to his son, had
the same recorded and left at the register's office until it was called for; the
son knowing nothing of the ransaction,
and the deed was returned to the grantor
on his demand; it was held that there
had been no delivery: Maynardv. May-

nard, 10 Mass. 456, but it is held other,

wise if the grantee had obtained the deed
from the registry: Harrisonv. Phillips
Academy, 12 Mass. 455, or assented to
it, or accepted it : Hedge v. Drew, 12
Pick. 141. But where there is the mere
sending of the deed to the register, without the knowledge of the grantee, and
hence no act of acceptance express or
implied on his part, no title passes to the
grantee as against a creditor of the
grantor who attached the land before the
grantee had accepted the deed . Samson
v. Thornton, 3 Met. 275. And where
the grantor, in the absence of the grantee,
left the deed with the register to be re
corded, and after recordation it was given
back to the grantor; this constituted no
delivery, although the grantor may have
had notice of the conveyance: ./avqkes
v. Pike, 105 Mass. 560. But it shfud
be otherwise if the grantee had accepted
or asserted title under it, there being, of
course, no condition attached by the
grantor upon placing the deed for record:
Taylor v. McClure, 28 Ind. 39 ; Mal.
lett v. Page, 8 Id. 364 ; Stout v. Duning,
72 Id. 343 ; Hoffman v. Mackall, 5 0.
St. 124 ; Baldwin v. Snowden, 11 Id.
203 ; for the very good reason that there
cannot be a delivery without an acceptance: Fonda v. Sage, 46 Barb. 109 ;
Fos-ter v. Beardsley Scythe Co., 47 Id.
505 ; Black v. Hoyt, 33 0. St. 203.
Yet it has been held that a delivery to
the recorder, to be held for the grantee,
is a good delivery: Tompkins Y. Wheeler,
16 Pet. 106-not, however, if the grantee
repudiates the deed upon receiving notice, or, in other words, fails to accept.
The rule is, a deed does not operate
until delivered. There is no delivery
without an acceptance.
Any word or
act, express cr implied, which shows
that the grantor intended to deliver, and
the grantee intended to accept, is sufficient to constitute a good delivery. It is
a question of intent, provable as any
other fact; intent on behalf of the grantor
to deliver, and intent on the part of the
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grantee to accept, both of which can be
done expressly or by implication: Burkholder v. Cased, 47 Ind. 418 ; Somes v.
Pumphrey, 24 Id. 231. For instance,
where the name of the grantee has been
inserted by the grantor without the
knowledge of the grantee, and the deed
then placed on record by the grantor, if
the grantee disavow the conveyance, as
soon as the fact comes to his knowledge,
there is no delivery: Day v. Mooney, 4
Hun 134; because there was no acceptance, which is necessary to constitute
delivery : Kearney v. etffries, 48 Miss.
343; Merrill v. Swift, 18 Conn. 261 ;
Corbett v. Norcross, 35 N. H. 99. Therefore, to constitute delivery, there must
be the act of the grantor and the act of
the grantee. These acts can be expressed or implied. Any act or word
showing the intent is sufficient. Hence,
it was held that as the acceptance can be
expressed or implied, it is implied when
the deed is beneficial to the grantee, or
when he has notice and does not disavow
it : Kearney v. Teffries, 48 Miss. 343;
Tibbals v. Jacobs, 31 Conn. 431 ; Treadway v. Ins. Co., 29 Id. 71 ; .Ealloccv.
Bush, 2 Root 595; Graham v. Lambert,
5 Humph. 260. The trouble is in determining what constitutes an acceptance,
and as an acceptance is contained in a
delivery, the question would be what
constitutes a delivery: Hopkins v. Leek,
12 Wend. 105; Utterbach v. Binns, I
McL. 242; Fietcherv. Mansure, 5:Ind.
267 ; Gray v. State, 9 Id. 25. First,
then, what constitutes an acceptance?
There will be an acceptance if the
grantee fail to disavow the conveyance,
as soon as the fact comes to his knowledge: Day v. Mooney,. 4 Hun 134 ; but
not when the deed is delivered to the
grantee's agent to be held whilst his
principal considers the question of its
acceptance, though the deed be placed
upon record: Ford v. .. ames, 4 Keyes
300; s. 0. 2 Abb. Dec. 159; Carnes v.
Platt,6 Rob. 270. An acceptance may
be presumed from the beneficent nature

of the transaction, and will not be presumed where the grantee derives no
benefit, or is subject to a duty, or the
performance of a trust: Printardv. Bodle, 20 Johns. 184 ; Ten Eyck v. Richards, 6 Cow. 617. If presumed from
the benefit conferred by the deed, to rebut
that presumption there must be a disavowal, and, in the latter case, an express acceptance: Fonda v. Sage, 46
Barb. 109 ; Carnes v.I att, 6 Rob. 270 ;
Stephens v. Buffalo 4- New York City Rd.
Co., 20 Barb. 332. The acceptance can
be expressed or implied : Foster v.
Beardsley Scythe Co., 47 Id. 505. The
fact of acceptance may be found from the
acts of the parties, preceding, attending
and subsequent to the signing, sealing,
and acknowledgment of the instrument:
Dukes v. Spangler, 35 0. St. 119. But
in all cases there must be an acceptance
to vest the grantee with title under it,
because a conveyance cannot be forced
upon a man: Lloyd v. Giddings, 7 Ohio,
2 pt. 53; Kearny v. Jeffries, 48 Miss.
343. A person indebted to a bank executed a mortgage for the debt, but without the knowledge of the bank, and after
depositing the paper for record, sent
word to the bank that such mortgage had
been executed and left for record, the
cashier replying that he was glad of it.
In a contest for priority between the
bank and a subsequent mortgagee, it was
held that the facts showed a good acceptance: Farm. 4-Mech. Bank v. Drury,
38 Vt. 426.
Wat conststutes a Delivery:-There
is no formality necessary : Farrarv.
Bridges, 5 Humph. 411. It can be by
acts or by words, expressed or implied.
If the intention to make a delivery is
evinced or manifested in any clear and
unequivocal manner, it is sufficient, and
it is a question of fact open to parol evidence and may be inferred from cireumstances : Add. Cont. 7. Hence, if that
intent is clear from the fact of delivery
for record, it is a good delivery: Thompson v. Jones, I Head 576 ; Nidolv. Da-
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vidson Co., 3 Tenn. Ch. 546; Watson v.
livery is good if made by a releaser to
1Byan, Id. 40. Bat the deed must
the agent of the releasee : Bd. v. llf,
have been properly executed, the grantor
13 0. St. 235, and when grantee agreed
divested of the power to recall it, and beforehand to accept: Hoffman v. Mackgrantee must have accepted it: Brevard all, 5 0. St.124, and when a husband dev- Neely, 2 Sneed 165; Kirkman v.
livers the joint deed of himself and wife
Bank, 2 Cold. 402; although the deed
without the knowledge of the wife, or
remain in the actual custody of the
notice of her dissent: Baldin v. Snowgrantor: Sedgerwood v. Gatdt, 2 Lea
den, 11 0. St. 203; and where delivered
646 ; Farrarv. Bridges, supra; McEwen to a vendee,although upon an understandv. Troost, 1 Sneed 186.
ing that it should not be effective until
It is a good delivery if the deed be the purchase-money be paid: Resor v.
delivered to a third person for the beneO.4-M.Rd. GJo. 17 0. St. 139, and where
ficiary: Graham v. Lambert, 5 Humph.
the cestui gue trust takes the deed from
595 ; to a third person to be delivered to
the table where it has been laid for bar,
the grantee at the death of the grantor,
and then kept it in her possession until
and such deed is so delivered ; the title her death, this is a good delivery: Taques
passes upon such last delivery, and the v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 17 Johns.
deed takes effect as of the date of the 548; s. c. I Johns. Ch.450. Andithas
first delivery: Crooks v. Crooks, 34 0.
been held that a delivery is also good,
St. 610; to the officer taking the acknow- even against the grantee's written proledgment, to be delivered to the grantee mise to return the deed on demand or pay
whenever he called for it, where it is ac- the consideration if no demand be made:
cepted by the grantee, although the offi- Howe v. Dewing, 2 Gray 476.
cer retains possession : Black v. Hoyt,
On the other hand, there is no delivery
33 0. St. 203. And so if the deed pass
if the deed be placed in the grantor's
from the control of the grantor by his trunk, to be there kept until after his
own act, with the declaration that it is
death, the grantor saying that when that
delivered for the use of the grantee (and
happened each man could get his own:
the grantee accepts): Eckman v. Eckman,
Taylor v. Taylor, 2 Humph. 597; nor
55 Pa. St. 269; Arthur v. Baescom, 28
if the deed be found amongst the grantor's
Leg. Int. 284: Steel v. Tuttle, 15 S. & effects after his death: Martin v. RamR. 210; Dayton v. Newman, 19 Pa. St. sey, 5 Humph. 349; nor if possession
194. Or if it be left with a magistrate,
has been obtained by fraud: Bitter v.
without instructions: Blight v. Schenck,
Worth, 58 N. Y. 627 ; nor when the
10 Id. 285 ; if the grantee accept; and
grantee disavows the conveyance as soon
he accepts if he execute a purchase-mony
as the fact comes to his knowledge: Day
mortgage: McDowell v. Cooper, 14 S. & v. Mooney, 4 Hun 134 ; nor if the deed
It. 269. So, too, a delivery to a third
he placed in hands of a scrivener on conperson to hand over the deed, or record
dition : Epley v. Witherow, 17 Leg. Int.
the same after grantor's death: Stephens 356 ; nor if it is given to one of several
v. Huss, 53 Pa. St. 20 ; Stephens v. Rine- grantees without more: Hannahv. Swarhart, 72 Id. 434; when accepted: Mitchell ner, 8 Watts 9; nor if the deed be
v. Ryan, 3 0. St. 377. And it has been
surreptitiously or fraudulently taken
held that the deed of a wife's lands must
from the grantor's house, and this even as
be delivered to the grantee in her lifeto a bona fide purchaser: Van Amringe
time, in order to pass the estate : Shoen- v. Morton, 4 Whart. 382; norif obtained
bergerv. Zook, 34 Pa. St. 24; Shoenber- from the grantor's effects after his death
ger v. Backman, 37 Id. 87.
But the without more. Critchfieldv. Critchbleld,
reason for this is not apparent. The de- 24 Penn. St. 100; though it would be
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otherwise if any facts exist showing or
tending to show that the grantor intended
that the deed should be delivered to the
grantee: Stinger v. Com., 26 Penn. St.
422 ; nor the mere fact of recording:
Barr v. &chroeder, 32 Cal. 610 ; nor
delivery to a third person to await the
performance of certain conditions :
Ogden v. Ogden, 4 0. St. 182, and cases
cited; Lloyd v. Yiddings, 7 Ohio
375. And although the intention to
deliver existed at the time of execution,
yet, if the deed be retained by the grantor until his death, no title passes to the
grantee: McCrea v. Dunlap, 1 Johns.
Cas. 114 ; Stillwdlv. Hubbard, 20 Wend.
44 ; Osterhoutv. Shoemaker, 3 Hill 513;
-Tsherv. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416; Bryant
v. Bryant, 42 Id. 11 ; Roosevelt v.
Carow, 6 Barb. 190 ; nor where a person
in expectation of death delivers a deed
to a stranger to be delivered to the grantee after the grantor's death, and he recovers, receives back the deed and lives
nearly five years thereafter, and after

the grantor's death the grantee obtains
possession of the deed, does any title
pass to the grantee, because there is no
delivery of the deed: Jacobs v. Alexander, 19 Barb. 243; nor does delivery
arise from the sending of the deed to a
stranger, or its deposit in a public office,
unless sent or deposited for the use of the
grantee : Elsey v. Metcalf, I Den. 323;
and accepted by him: Ford v. James, 4
Keyes 300 ; nor where the grantor before
acknowledgment gives it to the grantee,
but after acknowledgment keeps it: Mills
v. Gore, 20 Pick. 28 ; or takes it for the
purpose of getting from his wife a release
of dower and not returning it to grantee :
Parker v. Parker, 1 Gray 409; nor
where the deed is delivered to a third
person "until called for" and is then
taken back by the grantor is there a
delivery: Maynard v. Haynard, 10
Mass. 456.
JoHNt F. KELLY.
Washington, D. C.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
STATE v. WALKER ET AL.
The mutual present assent to immediate marriage, by persons capable of assuming that relation, is sufficient to constitute marriage at common law ; and such a
marriage will be sustained in Kansas where its validity is directly drawn in question.
The legislature has full power, not to prohibit, but to prescribe reasonable regulations relating to marriage, and a provision prescribing penalties against those who
solemnize or contract marriage contrary to statutory command is within legislative
authority.
Punishment may be inificted upon those who enter the marriage relation in disregard of the prescribed statutory requirements, without rendering the marriage
itself void.

Under section 12 of the Marriage Act, all persons who enter the marriage relation,
and live together as man and wife, without complying with the conditions and regulations of the act, are guilty of a misdemeanor, and subject to the punishment
imposed by that section.

APPFL from Jefferson county.

E. 0. Walker and Lillian Harman were prosecuted in the Dis-
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trict Court of Jefferson county for a violation of section 12 of the
Marriage Act, which reads as follows: "That any persons, living
together as man and wife, within this state, without being married,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be fined in a sum of not less than five hundred dollars, nor more than one thousand dollars, or be imprisoned in the
county jail not less than thirty days, nor more than three months."
Comp. Laws 1879, p. 539. At the trial, which was had with a
jury, Moses Harman, the father of Lillian Harman, testified that
on September 19th 1886, his daughter, Lillian, and E. C. Walker
entered into what he called an "a u tonomistic marriage," at his
home, in the presence of himself and two other persons. On that
occasion, a statement concerning the compact or union about to be
entered into was read by the witness, then followed a statement
made by E. C. Walker, which was responded to by Lillian Harman,
and the ceremony was terminated by another short statement from
the witness. These statements were published in the "Lucifer," a
newspaper edited by the witness, and the account there given was
read in evidence, and is as follows :
" Autonomistic MarriagePracticalized.-Whiledistinctly denying the right of any citizen or citizens, whether minority or majority,
to inquire into our private affairs, or to dictate to us as to the manner in which we shall discharge our private duties and obligations
to each other, we wish it understood that we are not afraid nor
ashamed to let the world know the nature of the civil compact
entered intd between Lillian Harman and Edwin 0. Walker, at the
home of the senior editor of "Lucifer," on Sunday, the nineteenth
of September, 1886, of the common calendar. As our answer,
then, to the many questions in regard thereto, we have reproduced
as near as possible the aforesaid proceedings.
"(1) M. Harman, father of Lillian Harman, one of the parties to
this agreement or compact, read the following, as a general statement of principles in regard to marriage: 'Marriage, by which term
we mean the various attractions, sentiments, arrangements, and
interests, physical, social, material, involved in the sex-relations of
men and women, is, or should be, distinctively a personal matter, a
strictly private affair. There are, or should be, but two parties to
this arrangement or compact,-a man and a woman; or perhaps we
should say, a woman and a man, since the interests, the fate of
woman is involved, for weal or woe in marriage, to a far greater
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extent than is the fate or interests of man. Some one 'has said,
' Marriage is for man only an episode, while for woman it is the
6pic of her life.' Hence it would seem right and proper that, in
all arrangements pertaining to marriage, woman should have the
first voice or control. Marriage looks to maternity, motherhood,
as its most important result or outcome, and, as dame nature has
placed the burden of maternity upon woman, it would seem that
marriage should be emphatically and distinctively woman's work,
woman's institution. It need not be said that this is not the common, the popular, and especially, the legal view of marriage. The
very etymology itself of the word tells a very different story.
Marriage is derived from the French word 'mari' meaning the
' husband.' And never did the etymology of a word more truly
indicate its popular and legal meaning than does the etymology of
this one. Marriage, as enforced in so called Christian lands, as
well as in most heathen countries, is pre-eminently man's affair,
man's institution. Its origin-mythologic origin-declares that
woman was made for man, not man for woman, not each for the
other. History shows that man has ruled over woman as mythology
declares he should do ; and the marriage laws themselves show that
they were made by man for man's benefit, not for woman's. Marriage means, or results in, the family as an institution, and the laws
and customs pertaining thereto make man the head and autocrat
of the family. When a woman marries, she merges her individu
ality as a legal person into that of her husband, even to the surrender of her name, just as chattel slaves were required to take the
name of their master. Against all such invasive laws and unjust
discriminations, we, as autonomists, hereby most solemnly protest.
We most distinctly and positively reject, repudiate and abjure all
such laws and regulations ; and if we ever have acknowledged allegiance to these statute laws regulating marriage, we hereby renounce
and disclaim all such allegiance. To particularize and recapitulate:
Marriage being a strictly personal matter, we deny the right of
society, in the form, of church and state, to regulate it or interfere
with the individual man and woman in this relation. All such interference, from our standpoint, is regarded as an impertinence, and
worse than an impertinence. To acknowledge the right of the
state to dictate to us in these matters is to acknowledge ourselves
the children or minor wards of the state, not capable of transacting our own business; We therefore most solemnly and earnestly
VoL. XXXV.-58.
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repudiate, abjure, and reject the authority, the rites and ceremonies of church and state in marriage, as we reject the mummeries
of the church in the ceremony called baptism, and at the bedside
of the dying. The priest, or other state official, can no more prepare the contracting parties for the duties of marriage than he can
prepare the dying for life in another world. In either case, the
preparation must be the work of the parties immediately concerned.
We regard all such attempts at regulation on the part of church
and state as not only an impertinence, not only wrong in principle,
but disastrous to the last degree in practice. Here, as everywhere
else in the realm of personal rights and reciprocal duties, we regard
intelligent choice-untrampled voluntaryism-coupled with responsibility to natural law for our acts, as the true and only basis of
morality. As a matter of principle we are opposed to the making
of promises on occasions like this. The promise to I love and
honor' may become quite impossible of fulfilment, and that from
no fault of the party making such promise. The promise to ' love,
honor and obey, so long as both shall live,' commonly exacted of
woman, we -regard as a highly immoral promise. It makes woman
the inferior-the vassal-of her husband, and when, from any
cause, love ceases to exist between the parties, this promise binds
her to do an immoral act, viz. : It binds her to prostitute her sexhood at the command of an unloving and unlovable husband. For
these and other reasons that will readily suggest themselves, we, as
autonomists, prefer not to make any promises of the kind usually
made as part of marriage ceremonies.
"(2) E. 0. Walker, as one of the contracting parties, made the
following statement: ' This is a time for clear, frank statement.
While regarding all public marital ceremonies as essentially and
ineradicably indelicate,-a pandering to the morbid, vicious, and
meddlesome element in human nature,-I consider this form the
least objectionable. I abdicate in advance all the so-called ' marital rights' with which this public acknowledgment of our relationship may invest me. Lillian is and will continue to be as free to
repulse any and all advances of mine as she has been heretofore.
In joining with me in this love and labor union, she has not alienated a single natural right. She remains sovereign of herself, as I
of myself, and we severally and together repudiate all powers
legally conferred upon husbands and wives. In legal marriage,
woman surrenders herself to the law and to her husband, and be-
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comes a vassal. Here it is different; Lillian is now made free.
In brief, and in addition: I cheerfully and distinctly recognise
this woman's right to the control of her own person; her right and
duty to retain her own name ; her right to the possession of all
property inherited, earned, or otherwise justly gained by her; her
equality with me in this copartnership; my responsibility to her as
regards the care of offspring, if any, and her paramount right to
the custody thereof, should any unfortunate fate dissolve this union.
And now, friends, a few words especially to you. This wholly
private compact is here announced, not because I recognise that
you, or society at large, or the state, have any right to inquire into
or determine our relations to each other, but simply as a guarantee
to Lillian of my good faith towards her. And to this I pledge
my honor.'
" (3) Lillian Harman then responded as follows: 'I do not care
to say much ; actions speak more clearly than words, often. I
enter into this union with Mr. Walker of my own free will and
choice, and I agree with the views of my father and of Mr. Walker
as just expressed. I make no promises that it may become impossible or immoral for me to fulfil; but retain the right to act, always,
as my conscience and best judgment shall dictate. I retain, also,
my full maiden name, as I am sure it is my duty to do. With this
understanding, I give to him my hand in token of my trust in him,
and of the fidelity to truth and honor of my intentions toward
him.'
" Then M. Harman said: ' As the father and natural guardian
of Lillian Harman, I hereby give my consent to this union. I do
not ' give away the bride,' as I wish her to be always the owner of
her person, and to be free always to act according to her truest
and purest impulses, and as her highest judgment may dictate.'"
It was expressly admitted that no license for the marriage of the
defendants had been obtained, and that no marriage ceremony was
performed by any judge, justice of the peace, or licensed preacher
of the gospel, and that neither of the defendants belonged to the
Society of Friends or Quakers. The proceedings mentioned were
followed by the matrimonial cohabitation of the defendants. Upon
this testimony, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Motions in
arrest of judgment, and for a new trial, were filed and overruled,
and the judgment of the court was that the defendant E. 0. Walker
be confined in the county jail for a period of seventy-five days, and
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the defendant Lillian Harman for a period of forty-five days, and
that the defendants pay the costs of the action, and stand committed to the jail of the county until payment is made. The defendants appealed.
Overmeyer &' Safford, and G. 6. Clemens, for the appellants.
S. B. Bradford, Atty. Gen., and W. F. Gilluly, for the state.
JOHNSTON, J.-The questions to be determined upon this appeal arise upon an instruction given to the jury upon the trial, in
which it was said that, "if the defendants, at the time alleged in
the information, and in this state, agreed to live together as husband and wife, without having a license to be married, and without
having a marriage solemnized by a judge, justice of the peace, or
licensed minister of the gospel, and in pursuance of such agreement lived together in this county, they would be guilty of the
offence charged in the information." The instruction is founded
upon the Marriage Act, and the manifest theory of the court is that
the law of Kansas has provided rules regulating the marriage contract, and has prescribed a penalty or punishment for those who
live together as man and wife without observing its requirements.
In behalf of the appellants, it is urged that what was said and done
by them was sufficient to constitute marriage at common law. It is
claimed that the formalities prescribed by statutes are not essential
to the validity of the marriage, and that, as the contract of marriage between the defendants was not void, they are not punishable
for failing to observe the statutory requirements in entering into
the marriage contract, and that, therefore, the instruction given
was erroneous.
The correctness of the instruction depends upon the proper interpretation of the Marriage Act. The first section of the act provides that a marriage contract shall be considered in law as a civil
contract, to which the consent of the parties is essential, and that
the ceremony may be regarded either as a civil ceremony or as a
religious sacrament; but it provides that !' the marriage relation
shall only be entered into, maintained or abrogated, as provided by
law." The second section provides that consanguinity shall be an
impediment to marriage, and all marriages between the forbidden
degrees of consanguinity are declared to be incestuous and void.
The third section declares that all persons who contract, license, or
solemnize an incestuous marriage, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
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and subje'ct to fine and imprisonment. The fourth section declares
a penalty against any person who shall join others in marriage
before a license has been issued by the probate judge. The fifth
section provides that the probate judge shall issue a license to all
persons legally entitled to the same, upon application, and prescribes
the form of the license. In the sixth section the probate judge is
required to make a record of the licenses issued by him, as well as
of the return endorsed upon the license by the person performing
the marriage ceremony, and states the fee to which he is entitled.
The seventh section visits a penalty upon the probate judge who
refuses or neglects to issue a license to a person legally entitled
thereto, when application is made, or who neglects to make a record
of the license issued, or the return endorsed thereon. The eighth
section empowers the probate judge to administer oaths and examine witnesses with reference to the right of persons who apply to
him for license to assume the marriage relation, and also prescribes
a penalty for issuing a license to persons not legally entitled thereto.
The ninth section provides that marriages contracted outside of this
state, and which are valid where contracted, shall be deemed valid
in this state. The tenth section provides that every judge, justice
of the peace, or licensed preacher of the gospel may perform the
marriage ceremony in this state, and shall certify on the back of
the license the fact of the marriage, and the date thereof, and cause
the license to be returned to the probate judge within thirty days.
To that section is added a proviso that marriages solemnized among
the Society of Friends or Quakers, in accordance with their forms
and usage, shall be good and valid, and shall not be affected by the
provisions of the marriage act. The eleventh section provides that
the books of record of marriage licenses, and the entries therein
certified to by the probate judge, under his official seal, shall be
evidence in all courts. The twelfth section, and the one under
which this prosecution is brought, provides that "any persons living together as man and wife within this state, without being married, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," etc. ; and the
thirteenth section provides that all records heretofore kept relating
to marriages, shall be delivered to the probate judge in the county
within thirty days after the taking effect of the act.
It is palpable that the leading idea and purpose of this act is to
compel publicity, and to require a record to be made of the marriages contracted in Kansas. By the terms of the act, marriage is
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declared to be a civil contract, the essential feature of which is the
consent of the parties. No particular ceremony or form of solemnization is prescribed or required. The settled doctrine of the law
to be applied in a case where the validity of a marriage is drawn
in question is that, in the absence of all civil or statutory regulations, the mutual present assent to immediate marriage by persons
cap~ible of assuming that relation is sufficient, without any formal
solemnization, Such a contract constitutes a marriage at common
law, and its validity will be sustained, unless some statute expressly
declares it to be void: Meister v. Moore, 99 U. S. 76; 1 Bish.
Mar. & Div. §§ 279, 280, 283, et seq., and numerous cases there
cited. It may also be conceded to be well established that marriage, being a natural right, and existing before the statutes, is
favored by the law; and that all statutory regulations, if the language
will permit, are to be construed as merely directory. "The doctrine
has become established in authority that a marriage, good at the common law, is good, notwithstanding the existence of any statute on the
subject, unless the statute contains express words of nullity:" I Bish.
Mar. &Div. § 283. It is also true, that according to the terms of the
Marriage Act, the only marriage contracts declared to be void are
those entered into between persons closely allied in blood, which are
everywhere prohibited. No such relationship existed between the
defendants; nor is it shown that there was any impediment to their
marriage. The penalties inflicted by other provisions of the statute
upon officers and those who fail to observe the required formalities,
do not necessarily render a consensual marriage void; but this does
not meet the charge against the defendants, nor render erroneous
the instruction of the court. If the question involved in the case
was whether the marriage was void or voidable, or if the legitimacy
of children were in question, the argument of the defendants would
be more applicable; and yet we are not prepared to say that the
contract between the defendants is a common-law marriage. The
question actually presented is whether the legislature intended to
inflict punishment on those who entered the marriage relation without observing the statutory regulations. The legislature has full
power, not to prohibit, but to prescribe reasonable regulations relating to marriage ; and a provision making it an offence, and
punishing those who solemnize or contract marriage contrary to
statutory command, is within the legislative authority. Punishment may be inflicted on those who enter the marriage relation in
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disregard of the prescribed statutory conditions, without rendering
the marriage itself void.
In Tetir v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129, the Supreme Court of Indiana,
while holding that ceremonial rites were not indispensable, and that
the intention to assume the relation of husband and wife, attended
by pure and just motives, and accompanied by an open acknowledgment of that relation, is sufficient to constitute marriage, stated
that "persons may be punished for not obtaining licenses to marry,
or for not taking steps to secure a proper record of the marriage;
but there may nevertheless be a valid marriage." Mr. Bishop
says that "this rule seems not to be peculiar to the common law.
It exists also in Sicily and in Scotland, where marriages contrary
to the established forms are frequent, and no question remains as
to their validity. The law imposes severe penalties upon the parties, the celebrator, and the witnesses :" 1 Bish. Mar. and Div.
§ 287. This, in our opinion, is the legislative purpose and expression in enacting section 12 of the marriage act. The provision imposing a penalty upon those who live together as man and wife,
without being married, is a part of the marriage act, wherein is
provided how marriage contracts may be entered into and solemnized. In the first section of the act, it is provided that the marriage relation shall only be entered into in the manner provided by
law. It proceeds to state what the manner is, and then prescribes
penalties that are to be visited on all who disregard the rules laid
down. It is to be observed that the law relating to marriage was
changed in 1867, at which time the words were added to the first
section that " the marriage relation shall only be entered into,
maintained, or abrogated as provided by law." At the same time,
the twelfth section was added, providing the punishment which the
defendants are now seeking to escape. These changes were not
idly made, but were manifestly intended to compel compliance with
the formalities and conditions prescribed. It is evident from the
penalties imposed, that the legislature deemed the enforcement of
the statutory regulations as important and beneficial, not only to
the parties contracting marriage, but to society at large as well.
The probate judge is to be punished if he issues a license to those
not entitled to one ; magistrates and ministers of the gospel are
forbidden under heavy penalties to marry persons before a license
has been obtained; and the probate judge is declared guilty of an
offence if he fails to properly record the license and the return
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thereon. By these and other penalties, the legislature undertook
to prevent the officers and ministers from authorizing or solemnizing marriages, where the conditions and formalities of the statute
have not been observed. The same idea is further carried out in
the twelfth section, by visiting a punishment upon the parties themselves for failing to conform to the rules prescribed. The legislature directs how parties may be married, and then declares a
punishment against them for living together as man and wife without being married as the law provided. It is true that the penalty
is directed against those who live together as man and wife-" without being married." These words, we think, refer to those who
assume the marriage relation, without being married in the manner
and upon the' conditions that the legislature has declared marriage
should be contracted. When persons who are permitted to marry
"live together as man and wife," it may be taken as an expression
of consent ; and consent, under these circumstances, is sufficient,
as we have seen, to constitute a marriage at common law. It was
certainly not intended that persons guilty of bigamy or adultery,
nor persons who intermarry or cohabit with each other that are
within the forbidden degrees of consanguinity, nor yet that a man
or woman, one or both of whom are married, who shall abide or
cohabit with each other, should be prosecuted and punished under
this provision, as those defences are defined, and the punishment
declared, in the Crimes act : Gen. St. c. 31, art. 7. Under that
act, severe punishment is measured out to those who marry or live
together as man and wife where there is a legal impediment to their
marriage. For these offences there is a maximum punishment presdribed of from five to seven years imprisonment, while a conviction
under the provisions of the marriage act which we are considering,
subjects the parties to a mere fine, or to imprisonment in the county
jail not more than three months.
The exception made by the statute in regard to marriages solemnized among the society of Friends or Quakers, lends support to
the view which we have taken. Marriage with them is based on
consent, publicly declared in one of their meetings, and has all the
elements necessary to make it good at common law. According to
the defendants' theory, they would not be liable to the penalty
written in section 12, because marriage celebrated in accordance
with their usage is valid at common law. But to relieve them from
complying with the formalities of the statute, and to exempt them
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from the penalty provided, the legislature deemed it necessary to
except their informal marriages from the operation of the act. The
argument made that, to require an observance of the statutory
regulations, trenches upon the liberty of consciendeguaranteed by
the constitution, is not sound. Although marriage is generally
solemnized with some religious ceremony, it is not under the control of ecclesiastical or religious authority. No religious rite or
ceremony is prescribed. The intervention of a preacher or priest
is not essential, and no religious qualification is required. So careful was the legislature to guard against any such invasion, that no
particular form of ceremony is prescribed ; and in the first section
of the act it is declared that the ceremony may be regarded either
as a civil ceremony or as a religious sacrament. The regulations
prescribed are neither burdensome nor unreasonable. These parties may go before a probate judge and obtain a license for a nominal
fee, and there, in his presence, and without further rite or ceremony, perfect the marriage by declaring that they take each other
for man and wife. The so-called "1mummeries of the church"
against which the defendants so strenuously object and protest may
be wholly omitted, and they may be married in as plain and matter
of fact manner, and with as short and simple a ceremony, as can
be desired, by a justice of the peace or other magistrate. It cannot be doubted that the purpose of the statutory regulation is wise
and salutary. They give publicity to a contract which is of deep
concern to the public, discourage deception and seduction, prevent
illicit intercourse under the guise of matrimony, relieve from doubt
the status of parties who live together as man and wife, and the
record required to be made furnishes evidence of the status and legitimacy of their offspring. In the accomplishment of this purpose
it was just as necessary to provide a penalty against parties who
contract marriage in disregard of the rules prescribed, as against
officers and ministers who only perform a minor part in the proceedings; and we have no doubt that this was the legislative intention in the enactment of section 12 of the Marriage Act. We see
no reason to declare the act invalid, and finding no error in the
record, we must affirm the judgment of the District Court.
HORTON, C. J. (concurring).-Uponthe record, as presented to
us, the question, in my opinion, for consideration is, not whether
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Edwin Walker and Lillian Harman are married, but whether, in
marrying, or rather in living together as man and wife, they have
observed the statutory requirements. The language of the statute
is: "The marriage relation shall only be entered into, maintained
or abrogated as provided by law," and " any persons living together
as man and wife, within this state, without being married, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor :" Section 12, c. 61, Oomp.'Laws
1879. My construction of these provisions is that a ceremoni.i
marriage must be celebrated in conformity therewith ; and that any
persons living together as man and wife, without being married according to these directions, are liable to the penalty thereof. I do
not say, nor do I intend to intimate, that a "consensual marriage"
is not valid ; but the legislature has the right to require parties
assuming the marriage relation to have the marriage entered into
publicly, and a retord made of the same. This I think the purpose of the statutory regulations. Whatever commands the state
may give respecting a formal marriage, the courts usually hold a
marriage at common law to be good, notwithstanding the statute,
unless it contains express words of nullity; yet persons who marry
without conforming to the statutory regulations, may be punished,
although the marriage itself be valid.
The consequences of marriage; as to conjugal rights and the
rights of heirs, are so momentous that the interest of society may
properly require a 'witness to the marriage, and a record of its acknowledgment. This much is required in the acknowledgment
and registration of an ordinary conveyance of real estate. If there
be no registration, no officiator, and no eye-witness of the marriage,
the woman is placed at the mercy of the man, who may deny the
"consensual relation," and repudiate her; and, on the other hand,
a man may be blackmailed by an adventuress, who may. declare
there was a " consensual marriage " when there was none ; therefore, the statute requiring the registration and acknowledgment of
marriage is for the benefit of the parties as well as their heirs. No
man, who desires in good faith to make a woman his wife, will
object to obtaining a marriage license, and going before some person
authorized to perform the marriage ceremony, and acknowledging the
marriage. The fees for a marriage license, and its return, are only
two dollars. The acknowledgment of the marriage relation may be
made for a trifling sum, unless the parties voluntarily donate a
liberal fee.
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As a rule, I do not think that any woman who has reached the
years of discretion, and has a full appreciation of the marriage
relation, will demur, when it is proposed to clothe her matrimonial
association with the forms of law. If the man objects to having
his marriage public, he tacitly admits that he intends to cheat her
whom he has privately promised to make his wife. It is only just
that the acknowledgment and registration of the marriage relation
should not be left to the whim and caprice of the parties, because
no transaction in the life of a man or woman is more important, or
fraught with more significant consequences ; and society is supremely
interested in having a marriage entered into publicly, and to have
a record thereof.
But counsel claim that Edwin Walker and Lillian Hlarman should
not be imprisoned on account of their non-observance of the statutory provisions regarding marriage, upon the ground that the
statute "is an interference with their conscience," and therefore
unconstitutional. Section 7, Bill of Rights. The assertion that
the acknowledgment and registration of a marriage conflicts with
any right of conscience, is wholly without foundation. The provisions of the act relating to marriage, no more infringe the state
constitution than does the law regulating the acknowledgment and
registration of real estate conveyances, chattel mortgages, &c.; in
fact, but little more ceremony is required for the one than for the
other. The statute does not demand that the marriage ceremony
shall be regarded as a religious sacrament ; no recognition of the
pope, or the church of Rome, or any minister, priest, church,
religion or superstition is required; no intervention of a person in
"holy orders" is requisite. The marriage does not have to be
celebrated in any church, chapel or other religious or public edifice.
A probate judge or a justice of the peace may solemnize the marriage, and this may be done at the home of the parties, in the
office of the official, or any other place the parties may select. The
ceremony, if the parties so desire, may consist in the simple presentation to the official of the marriage license, and a request that
he take cognizance of the mutual engagement of tle parties to
assume the marriage relation. No special form or solemnization is
prescribed or demanded.
Instead of permitting the man, as in olden times, to go to the
house where his .betrothed resides, and lead her away to his own
house, and call her his wife, and live with her as his wife, the.
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statute requires the man and wife, if they are to live together
in the marriage relation, to obtain a license at the office of the probate judge, and have their mututal engagement acknowledged
before some authorized person. The license, after the marriage, is
to be returned to the office of the probate judge, and the registration thereof becomes public. If the parties in this case preferred
to enter into the marriage relation without any religious or other
elaborate ceremony, they could have done so within the terms of the
statute, by obtaining a license, and going quietly before some justice
of the peace, and had their marriage relation there witnessed and
acknowledged. They might have had as much ceremony, or as
little, as they chose. I cannot understand how the provisions of
the statute can-be truthfully denounced a 1 monstrosity," or in what
way the "sacred liberty," or "1the personal rights" of the parties
are infringed. If Lillian Harmau desires to retain her own name,
I can perceive no objection for her doing so. There is nothing in
the statute justifying a man in being guilty of cruelty, or other
inhuman or brutal conduct towards his wife, and the wife does not
merge her individuality, as a legal person, in that of her husband.
The constitution and statutes of Kansas are very liberal in
recognising the rights and privileges of women. Marriage involves
neither the assumption of indebtedness nor the acquisition of property. A married woman may contract and be contracted with
concerning her separate real and personal property; sell, convey
and encumber the same; sue and be sued with reference thereto, in
the same manner, and to the same extent, and with like effect, and
as freely, as any other person may, in regard to his or her real or
personal property. She may purchase personal property from her
husband, perform labor and services on her sole and separate
account, and make the earnings therefrom her sole and -separate
property. She has the same control of her person and property as
her husband. She has the same rights as to the nurture, education and control of her children, and, also, the same rights in
the possession of the homestead. Knaggs v. lTlastin, 9 Kan.
532; Tallman v. Jones, 18 Id. 438; Going v. Orns, 8 Id. 85;
Larimer v. Kelley, 10 Id. 298; Butler v. Butler, 21 Id. 526.
She may participate in all city elections, attend caucuses, nominate
candidates, and vote for such persons and principles as her judgment dictates. In fact, in Kansas, a woman, in nearly all matters,
is accorded civil and political equality with man. She is not his
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servant or his slave. Here the sexes may harmonize in opinion,
and co-operate in effort; here woman is no longer subordinate to
man, but the two are co-ordinate together; here the burden of a
common prejudice and a common ignorance against woman has
been wholly removed; here the tyranny which degrades and crushes
the wives and mothers in oth~r countries no longer exists; here the
coveted rewards of life, forever forbidden them in some of the
states, are-within their reach; here a fair field for their genius and
industry is open, and womanhood, with the approbation of all,
may assert its divinely chartered rights, and fulfil its noblest
duties.
If Edwin Walker and Lillian Harman are suffering imprisonment, it is because they have wilfully and obstinately refused to
conform to the simple. and inexpensive regulations of the statute
directing marriage. In their non-observance of these regulations,
they have exhibited neither good sense nor sound reason. For purposely and publicly defying the law, enacted'for their benefit, and
the benefit of their offspring, if they shall have any, they are now
punished; and if they persist in the future in living together as
man and wife, without complying with the statute, they deserve,
and undoubtedly will receive, further punishment, if criminal proceedings be instituted against them. They can at any time easily
procure a license to marry, go before an officer, and acknowledge
their marriage; and then they will become, within all of the terms
of the statute, husband and wife. Then over their union there can
be no ontention; then the wife may be to the husband, in law and
in deed,"A guardian angel o'er his life presiding,
Doubling his pleasures, and his cares dividing."

VALENTINE, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance. I do
not believe that E. C. Walker and Lillian Harman were married in
any sense. In my opinion, their lengthy and prolix ceremony at
the time of forming their questionable union did not meet the
necessary requirements of the law, either statutory or common, to
establish a valid marriage. It is true, where a license is obtained,
and the parties are competent to marry each other, a bare acknowledgment before a judge, justice of .the peace or licensed preacher
of the gospel, that they in the present assume the marriage relation,
is all that is necessary to constitute a valid marriage; but none of
these things were done in the present case. I shall also assume
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that, aside from the statutes, but in accordance with the common
law, a valid consensual marriage may be created in Kansas. In
other words, the mere living together as husband and wife of a man
and woman competent to marry each other, with the honest intention
of being husband and wife so long as they both shall live, will constitute them husband and wife, and create a valid marriage. But
that is not this case. In the present case, the parties repudiated
nearly everything essential to a valid marriage, and openly avowed
this repudiation at the commencement of their union. They avowed
among other things, that they would not be governed by the laws
of the state or of society upon this subject, but would be governed
only by their own notions of right and propriety. 'They announced,
in effect that they "repudiated all powers legally conferred upon
husbands and wives," and that they "are opposed to the making of
promises," and that both were to remain free, as before their
union; and they did not make the necessary and essential
promises to constitute them husband and wife. Walker, as a
part of the ceremony, said, "I abdicate in advance all the so-called
marital rights ;" and Lillian Harman agreed with him in all things.
After this ceremony, which took place on Sunday, September 19th
1886, and up to their arrest in this case, which took place on Monday, the next day. after the ceremony, Walker and Lillian Harman
lived together as husband and wife, but without any intention of
being such in legal contemplation. That is, they lived together,
but had no intention of creating that relation or status known and
defined by law and by the customs and usages of all civilized society
as marriage. This living together under such circumstances did
not in law constitute a valid marriage. If they had lived together
for years, and until they had had children, and until one of them
had died, it might then, in the interest of the innocent children,
and notwithstanding the perverseness and waywardness of their
parents, be assumed and held that the parents had changed their
first unlawful intentions, and had converted what would have continued to be an unlawful union into a legal and valid marriage.
Much more might be said with reference to this question, but I
think this is sufficient. In my opinion, the union between E. C.
Walker and Lillian Harman was no marriage, and they deserve all
the punishment which has beein inflicted on them.

